Related provisions for SYSC 22.8.1

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To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

MAR 5.5.1RRP
6A firm8 must:(1) have effective arrangements and procedures, relevant to its8MTF, for the regular monitoring of the compliance by its users with its rules; and(2) monitor the transactions undertaken by its users under its systems in order to identify breaches of those rules, disorderly trading conditions, system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument,8 or conduct that may involve market abuse8. [Note: article 31(1)8 of MiFID]
SUP 1A.2.1GRP
(1) The Supervision manual (SUP) and Decision Procedure and Penalties manual (DEPP) form the Regulatory Processes part of the Handbook.(2) SUP sets out the relationship between the FCA and authorised persons (referred to in the Handbook as firms). As a general rule, SUP contains material that is of continuing relevance after authorisation.(3) DEPP is principally concerned with and sets out the FCA's decision making procedures that involve the giving of statutory notices, the FCA's
MAR 5A.7.1RRP
1A firm must:(1) have effective arrangements and procedures relevant to its OTF for the regular monitoring of the compliance by its users with its rules; and (2) monitor the transactions undertaken by its users under its systems in order to identify breaches of those rules, disorderly trading conditions, system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument, or conduct that may involve market abuse. [Note: article 31(1) of MiFID]
CONC 7.10.4GRP
Firms should note CONC 7.2.1 R (and its accompanying guidance) which requires firms to establish and implement policies and procedures for the fair and appropriate treatment of particularly vulnerable customers.
SUP 8.9.1GRP
The waivers regime is overseen by a staff committee. Its responsibility is to ensure that the giving of waivers is in accordance with the requirements of the Act, of the guidance in SUP 8 and of other relevant guidance. Decisions on individual applications are made under arrangements designed to result in rapid, responsive and well-informed decision making. The arrangements include arrangements for collective decision making to set general policies, and, as necessary, determine
COLL 12.3.5RRP
An EEA UCITS management company that manages a UCITS scheme must comply with the rules of the FCAHandbook which relate to the constitution and functioning of the UCITS scheme (the fund application rules), as follows:(1) the setting up and authorisation of the UCITS scheme (COLL 1 (Introduction), COLL 2 (Authorised fund applications), COLL 3 (Constitution), COLL 6.5 (Appointment and replacement of the authorised fund manager and the depositary), COLL 6.6 (Powers and duties of
COLL 12.3.6RRP
(1) An EEA UCITS management company that manages a UCITS scheme must establish appropriate procedures and arrangements to make information available at the request of the public or the FCA.(2) The EEA UCITS management company must ensure that the procedures and arrangements it establishes in accordance with (1), enable the FCA to obtain any information it requests directly from the management company.[Note: article 15 second paragraph and article 21(2) third paragraph, of the
BIPRU 1.2.11RRP
Trading intent must be evidenced on the basis of the strategies, policies and procedures set up by the firm to manage the position or portfolio in accordance with BIPRU 1.2.12 R.[Note: CAD 11(3)]
BIPRU 1.2.24RRP
Systems and controls must include at least the following elements:(1) documented policies and procedures for the process of valuation (including clearly defined responsibilities of the various areas involved in the determination of the valuation, sources of market information and review of their appropriateness, frequency of independent valuation, timing of closing prices, procedures for adjusting valuations, month end and ad-hoc verification procedures); and(2) reporting lines
IFPRU 4.6.8GRP
Accordingly, the FCA expects a firm using a variable scalar approach should adopt a PD that is the long-run default rate expected over a representative mix of good and bad economic periods, assuming that the current lending conditions including borrower mix and attitudes and the firm's lending policies remain unchanged. If the relevant lending conditions or policies change, then the FCA would expect the long-run default rate to change (see article 180(1)(a), (b) and (2)(a) of
IFPRU 4.6.13GRP
Segmentation should be done on the basis of the main drivers of both willingness and ability to pay. In the context of residential mortgages, an example of the former is the amount of equity in the property and an example of the latter is the ratio of debt to income. The FCA expects a firm to:(1) incorporate an appropriate number of drivers of risk within the segmentation to maximise the accuracy of the system;(2) provide detailed explanations supporting its choices of drivers,
SYSC 5.1.12RRP
A 10management company6 must ensure that its relevant persons are aware of the procedures which must be followed for the proper discharge of their responsibilities.[Note:10 article 4(1)(b) of the UCITS implementing Directive]644
SYSC 5.1.12AGRP
3Other firms should take account of the rule concerning awareness of procedures (SYSC 5.1.12 R) as if it were guidance (and as if should appeared in that rule10 instead of must) as explained in SYSC 1 Annex 1 3.3 R(1)10. 4
IFPRU 4.8.4GRP
The EAD required for IRB purposes is the exposure expected to be outstanding under a borrower's current facilities should it go into default in the next year, assuming that economic downturn conditions occur in the next year and a firm's policies and practices for controlling exposures remain unchanged other than changes that result for the economic downturn conditions.
IFPRU 4.8.12GRP
The FCA expects the time horizon for additional drawings to be the same as the time horizon for defaults. This means that EAD estimation need cover only additional drawings that might take place in the next year, such that:(1) no own funds requirements need be held against facilities, or proportions of facilities that cannot be drawn down within the next year; and(2) where facilities can be drawn down within the next year, firms may, in principle, reduce their estimates to the
MCOB 4.8A.17RRP
A firm which intends to transact execution-only sales in regulated mortgage contracts must have in place and operate in accordance with a clearly defined policy which:(1) sets out the amount of business the firm reasonably expects to transact by way of execution-only sales and the steps to be taken by the firm if that business exceeds the expected levels; and(2) sets out its processes and procedures for ensuring compliance with the rules in MCOB 4.8A; in particular:(a) how it
MCOB 4.8A.18RRP
(1) Whenever a firmenters into or arranges an execution-only sale for a regulated mortgage contract, it must make and maintain a record of:(a) the information provided by the customer which satisfies MCOB 4.8A.14R (1), (2) or (3);(b) the information in durable medium in MCOB 4.8A.14R (4);(c) (where applicable) the confirmation by the customer in MCOB 4.8A.14R (5); and(d) any advice from the firm which the customer rejected, including the reasons why it was rejected, before deciding
MAR 8.3.6RRP
A benchmark administrator must:(1) have effective arrangements and procedures that allow the regular monitoring and surveillance of benchmark submissions:(2) monitor the benchmark submissions in order to identify breaches of its practice standards (set out in MAR 8.3.10R (1)) and conduct that may involve manipulation, or attempted manipulation, of the specified benchmark it administers and provide to the oversight committee of the specified benchmark timely updates of suspected
MAR 8.3.7GRP
The arrangements and procedures referred to in MAR 8.3.6R (1) should include (but not be limited to):(1) carrying out statistical analysis of benchmark submissions, using other relevant market data in order to identify irregularities in benchmark submissions; and(2) an effective whistle-blowing procedure which allows any person on an anonymous basis to alert the benchmark administrator of conduct that may involve manipulation, or attempted manipulation, of the specified benchmark
MAR 5.3A.1RRP
1A firm must ensure that the systems and controls, including procedures and arrangements, used in the performance of its activities are adequate, effective and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business.
MAR 5.3A.8RRP
A firm must have systems and procedures to notify the FCA if:(1) an MTF operated by the firm is material in terms of the liquidity of trading of a financial instrument in the EEA; and(2) trading is halted in that instrument.[Note: article 48(5) of MiFID]
SYSC 3.2.6GGRP
5A firm should ensure that the systems and controls include:(1) appropriate training for its employees in relation to money laundering;(2) appropriate provision of information to its governing body and senior management, including a report at least annually by that firm'smoney laundering reporting officer (MLRO) on the operation and effectiveness of those systems and controls;(3) appropriate documentation of its risk management policies and risk profile in relation to money laundering,
SYSC 3.2.16GRP
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
COLL 8.5.2RRP
(1) The authorised fund manager must manage the scheme in accordance with:(a) the instrument constituting the fund;1212(b) The applicable rules13; (c) the most recently published prospectus; and(d) for an ICVC, the OEIC Regulations.(2) The authorised fund manager must carry out such functions as are necessary to ensure compliance with the rules13that impose obligations on the authorised fund manager or ICVC, as appropriate.(3) The authorised fund manager must:(a) make decisions
COLL 8.5.12GRP
The maximum period between dealing days for a qualified investor scheme will depend on the reasonable expectations of the target investor group and the particular investment objectives and policy of the scheme. For instance, for a scheme aiming to invest in large property developments, the expectation would be that it is reasonable to have a much longer period between dealing days for liquidity reasons than for a scheme investing predominantly in listed securities.
LR 8.6.13AGRP
4A sponsor will generally be regarded as having appropriate systems and controls for identifying and managing conflicts6 if it has in place effective policies and procedures:(1) to ensure that decisions taken on managing conflicts of interest are taken by appropriately senior staff and on a timely basis;(2) to monitor whether arrangements put in place to manage conflicts are effective; and6(3) to ensure that individuals within the sponsor are appropriately trained to enable them
LR 8.6.13BGRP
4The policies and procedures referred to in LR 8.6.13A G are distinct from the actual organisational and administrative arrangements that a sponsor is required to put in place and maintain under LR 8.3.9 R to manage specific conflicts.
COLL 6.2.7RRP
(1) The authorised fund manager may require, on agreement with the depositary, or may permit, on the request of the investor, direct issues and cancellations of units by an ICVC or by the depositary of an AUT or ACS7.7(2) If (1) applies:(a) the instrument constituting the fund8 must provide for this; and(b) the prospectus must provide details of the procedure to be followed which must be consistent with the rules in this section.8
COLL 6.2.12GRP

Explanatory table: This table belongs to COLL 6.2.2 G (4) (Purpose).

Correction of box management errors

1

Controls by authorised fund managers

An authorised fund manager needs to be able to demonstrate that it has effective controls over:

(1)

its calculations of what units are owned by it (its 'box'); and

(2)

compliance with COLL 6.2.8 R which is intended to prevent a negative box.

2

Controls by depositaries

(1)

Under COLL 6.6.4 (General duties of the depositary), a depositary should take reasonable care to ensure that a scheme2 is managed in accordance with COLL 6.2 (Dealing) and COLL 6.3 (Pricing and valuation).

(2)

A depositary should therefore make a regular assessment of the authorised fund manager's box management procedures (including supporting systems) and controls. This should include reviewing the authorised fund manager's controls and procedures when the depositary assumes office, on any significant change and on a regular basis, to ensure that a series of otherwise minor changes do not have a cumulative and a significant effect on the accuracy of the controls and procedures.

3

Recording and reporting of box management errors

(1)

An authorised fund manager should record all errors which result in a breach of COLL 6.2.8 R (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units) and as soon as an error is discovered, the authorised fund manager should report the fact to the depositary, together with details of the action taken, or to be taken, to avoid repetition of the error.

(2)

A depositary should report material box management errors to the FCA immediately. Materiality should be determined by taking into account a number of factors including:

  • the implications of the error for the sufficiency of controls put into place by the authorised fund manager;
  • the significance of any breakdown in the authorised fund manager's management controls or other checking procedures;
  • the significance of any failure of systems or back-up arrangements;
  • the duration of an error; and
  • the level of compensation due to the scheme, and an authorised fund manager's ability (or otherwise) to meet claims for compensation in full.

(3)

A depositary should also make a return to the FCA (in the manner prescribed by SUP 16.6.8 R) on a quarterly basis.
COLL 6.12.5RRP
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must establish, implement and maintain an adequate and documented risk management policy for identifying the risks to which that scheme is or might be exposed.(2) The risk management policy must comprise such procedures as are necessary to enable the authorised fund manager or UK UCITS management company to assess the exposure of each UCITS it manages to market risk, liquidity
COLL 6.12.12RRP
An authorised fund manager or a UKUCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must ensure that, for each UCITS it manages, the liquidity profile of the investments of the scheme is appropriate to the redemption policy laid down in the instrument constituting the fund2 or the prospectus.2[Note: article 40(4) of the UCITS implementing Directive]
SYSC 22.5.11GRP

Table: Examples of factors to take into account when deciding whether old misconduct is sufficiently serious to disclose

Factors to take into account

Comments

(A) Whether P has committed a serious breach of individual conduct requirements.

Individual conduct requirements has the same meaning as in Part Two of SYSC 22 Annex 1R (Template for regulatory references given by relevant authorised persons and disclosure requirements).

Factors to take into account in deciding whether the breach is serious include the following.

(1) The extent to which the conduct was deliberate or reckless.

(2) The extent to which the conduct was dishonest.

(3) Whether the breaches are frequent or whether they have continued over a long period of time. The fact that breaches were frequent or repeated may increase the likelihood that they should be disclosed since the breaches may show a pattern of non-compliance.

(4) The extent of loss, or risk of loss, caused to existing, past or potential investors, depositors, policyholders or other counterparties or customers.

(5) The reasons for the breach. For example, where the breach was caused by lack of experience which has been remedied by training or further experience, it is less likely that the breach will still be relevant.

(B) Whether the conduct caused B to breach requirements of the regulatory system or P was concerned in a contravention of such a requirement by B and, in each case, whether P’s conduct was itself serious.

(1) The factors in (A) are relevant to whether P’s conduct was serious.

(2) The seriousness of the breach by B is relevant. The factors in (A) are also relevant to this.

(3) A breach by B of certain requirements is always likely to be serious under (2). Breach of the threshold conditions is an example. However that does not mean that P’s involvement will automatically be serious.

(C) Whether P’s conduct involved dishonesty (whether or not also involving a criminal act).

Dishonesty is an important factor but it is not automatically decisive in every case. For instance, a small one-off case of dishonesty many years ago may not be sufficiently serious to require disclosure.

(D) Whether the conduct would have resulted in B’s dismissing P, had P still been working for B, based on B's disciplinary policies and the requirements of the law about unfair dismissal.

(E) Whether the conduct was such that, if B was considering P for a role today and became aware of the historical conduct, B would not employ P today notwithstanding the time that has passed.

Note 1: P refers to the employee about whom the reference is being written.

Note 2: B refers to the firm giving the reference.
SYSC 22.5.18GRP
(1) A firm should, wherever feasible, conclude investigative procedures before the employee departs. (2) However, this chapter does not create a duty to investigate alleged misconduct by an employee or former employee.(3) There are several reasons why a firm may find it appropriate to investigate potential misconduct by an employee or former employee, including:(a) assessing the actual and potential damage resulting from misconduct;(b) identifying other individuals potentially