Related provisions for BIPRU 7.10.55O

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RCB 2.3.4GRP
To demonstrate that the issuer and the proposed owner will comply with Regulation 17, and Regulations 23 and 24 of the RCB Regulations (capability of the asset pool to cover claims), the issuer should set out what it considers to be the risks of the regulation not being complied with and show how those risks have been adequately mitigated by reference to the tests and provisions set out in the covered bond or programme documentation.
RCB 2.3.5GRP
Regulations 17(2)(d) (requirements on issuer relating to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) require the issuer of a regulated covered bond and the owner of the relevant asset pool to make arrangements so that the asset pool is of sufficient quality to give investors confidence that in the event of the failure of the issuer there will be a low risk of default in the timely payment by the owner of claims attaching to a regulated covered
RCB 2.3.6GRP
The FCA will:(1) expect the issuer to demonstrate that it has in place appropriate systems, controls, procedures and policies, including in relation to risk management, underwriting, arrears and valuation; (2) expect the issuer to demonstrate that the cash-flows generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the payments due in a timely manner including under conditions of economic stress and in the event of the failure of the issuer;(3) take account of any over collateralisation
RCB 2.3.7GRP
The risk factors which the FCA will take into account in assessing the issuer's and owner's compliance with Regulations 17(2)(d) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) will include credit risk of the assets, concentration risk, market risk and counterparty risk.
RCB 2.3.9GRP
Concentration risk is the risk of loss from exposures being limited in number or variety. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include:(1) the level of granularity of the asset pool (i.e. what is the number and size distribution of assets in the pool); (2) whether the borrowers or collateral is unduly concentrated in a particular industry, sector, or geographical region.
SYSC 21.1.2GRP
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
SYSC 21.1.5GRP
(1) The appropriate regulator considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current
SYSC 21.1.6GRP
In carrying out their risk governance responsibilities, a firm'sgoverning body and governing body risk committee should have regard to any relevant advice from its audit committee or internal audit function concerning the effectiveness of its current control framework. In addition, they should remain alert to the possible need for expert advice and support on any risk issue, taking action to ensure that they receive such advice and support as may be necessary to meet their responsibilities
SYSC 19A.1.5RRP
(1) This rule applies to a firm that is unable to comply with the Remuneration Code because of an obligation it owes to a Remuneration Code staffmember under a provision of an agreement made on or before 29 July 2010 (the "provision").(2) A firm must take reasonable steps to amend or terminate the provision referred to in (1) in a way that enables it to comply with the Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.(3) Until the provision referred to in (1) ceases to prevent the
SYSC 19A.1.6GRP
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the Third Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2010/76/EU)which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published
SYSC 19A.1.7GRP
(1) The Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the appropriate regulator expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and
SYSC 19A.1.8GRP
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
BIPRU 5.6.19RRP
(1) A firm must be able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that the firm's risk management system for managing the risks arising on the transactions covered by the master netting agreement is conceptually sound and implemented with integrity and that, in particular, the minimum qualitative standards in (2) – (11) are met.(2) The internal risk-measurement model used for calculation of potential price volatility for the transactions is closely integrated into the daily risk-management
BIPRU 5.6.22RRP
A firm may use empirical correlations within risk categories and across risk categories provided that it is able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that the firm's system for measuring correlations is sound and implemented with integrity.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 3 point 19]
BIPRU 5.6.24RRP
The fully adjusted exposure value (E*) for a firm using the master netting agreement internal models approach must be calculated according to the following formula:E* = max {0, [(∑E -∑C) + (VaR output of the internal models)]}where(1) (where risk weighted exposure amounts are calculated under the standardised approach) E is the exposure value for each separate exposure under the agreement that would apply in the absence of the credit protection;(2) C is the value of the securities
BIPRU 5.6.25RRP
In calculating risk weighted exposure amounts using the master netting agreement internal models approach, a firm must use the previous business day's model output.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 3 point 21]
BIPRU 5.6.29RRP
(1) A firm must under the standardised approach calculate risk weighted exposure amounts for repurchase transactions and/or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and/or other capital market-driven transactions covered by master netting agreements under this rule.(2) E* as calculated under BIPRU 5.6.5 R to BIPRU 5.6.25 R must be taken as the exposure value of the exposure to the counterparty arising from the transactions subject to the master netting agreement
BIPRU 3.3.3GRP
Regulation 22 of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006 deals with recognition by the appropriate regulator of eligible ECAIs for exposurerisk weight purposes. Regulation 25 deals with revoking recognition.
BIPRU 3.3.4GRP
The criteria which the appropriate regulator must apply when assessing ECAIs for recognition for exposurerisk weighting purposes are set out in Regulation 22 and Schedule 1 to the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006. In making an assessment against those criteria and in carrying out the mapping process described in BIPRU 3.3.7 G to BIPRU 3.3.9 G the appropriate regulator will have regard to the approach set out in the Committee of European Banking Supervisors' "Guidelines on
BIPRU 3.3.6GRP
The list of eligible ECAIs includes those who have been recognised as eligible for exposurerisk weighting purposes by a competent authority of another EEA State and are subsequently recognised as eligible ECAIs by the appropriate regulator without carrying out its own evaluation process under Regulation 22(2) of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006.
BIPRU 3.3.7GRP
Under Regulation 22(3) of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006 the appropriate regulator is obliged to determine, taking into account the requirements set out in Schedule 2 to the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006, with which of the credit quality steps set out in Part 1 of Annex VI of the Banking Consolidation Directive the relevant credit assessments of an eligible ECAI are to be associated. Those determinations should be objective and consistent.
BIPRU 5.7.1RRP
The following parties may be recognised as eligible providers of unfunded credit protection:(1) central governments and central banks;(2) regional governments or local authorities;(3) multilateral development banks;(4) international organisationsexposures which are assigned a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach;(5) public sector entities, claims on which are treated as claims on institutions or central governments under the standardised approach;(6) institutions;(7)
BIPRU 5.7.8RRP
A firm must be able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that it has systems in place to manage potential concentration of risk arising from the firm's use of guarantees and credit derivatives. The firm must be able to demonstrate how its strategy in respect of its use of credit derivatives and guarantees interacts with its management of its overall risk profile.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 2 point 15]
BIPRU 5.7.9RRP
Where an exposure is protected by a guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a central government or central bank, a regional government or local authority or a public sector entity claims on which are treated as claims on the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established under the standardised approach, a multilateral development bank or an international organisation,1to which a 0% risk weight is assigned under or by virtue of the standardised approach, or a public
BIPRU 5.7.21RRP
Where a firm transfers a part of the risk of a loan in one or more tranches, BIPRU 9 applies. Materiality thresholds on payments below which no payment shall be made in the event of loss are considered to be equivalent to retained first loss positions and to give rise to a tranched transfer of risk.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 3 point 86]
BIPRU 9.10.2RRP
In respect of a securitisation position in respect of which a 1250% risk weight is assigned, a firm may, as an alternative to including the position in its calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts, deduct from its capital resources the exposure value of the position. For these purposes, the calculation of the exposure value may reflect eligible funded protection in a manner consistent with BIPRU 9.14.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 points 35, 74 and 75(b)]
BIPRU 9.10.3RRP
Where a firm applies BIPRU 9.10.2 R, 12.5 times the amount deducted in accordance with that paragraph must, for the purposes of BIPRU 9.11.5 R and BIPRU 9.12.8 R, be subtracted from the amount specified in whichever of those rules applies as the maximum risk weighted exposure amount to be calculated by a firm to which one of those rules applies.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 point 36 and point 76]
BIPRU 9.10.4RRP
The risk weighted exposure amount of a securitisation position to which a 1250% risk weight is assigned may be reduced by 12.5 times the amount of any value adjustments made by the firm in respect of the securitised exposures.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 point 72 (part)]
CREDS 2.2.1GRP
SYSC 4.1.1 R requires every firm, including a credit union, to have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing
CREDS 2.2.21GRP
(1) The committee of management should decide what form this documentation should take, but the committee should have in mind the following points.(a) Documents should be comprehensive: they should cover all material aspects of the operations of the credit union.(b) Documents should be integrated: separate elements of the system should be cross-referred so that the system can be viewed as a whole.(c) Documents should identify risks and the controls established to manage those
CREDS 2.2.54GRP
The committee of management should have a satisfactory planning system to provide a framework for growth and development of the credit union, and to enable it to identify, measure, manage and control risks of regulatory concern.
CREDS 2.2.58GRP
The committee of management should consider the range of possible outcomes in relation to various risks. These risks are increased when a credit union provides ancillary services such as issuing and administering means of payment and money transmission, which result, in particular, in higher liquidity and operational risks.
CREDS 2.2.61GRP
The policy and procedures manual should cover all aspects of the credit union's operations, including matters such as:(1) cash handling and disbursements;(2) collection procedures;(3) lending, including large exposures (see CREDS 7.1 to CREDS 7.5);(4) arrears management (see CREDS 7.2.9 G to CREDS 7.2.10 G);(5) provisioning (see CREDS 7.5);(6) liquidity management (see CREDS 6);(7) financial risk management (see CREDS 3);(8) money laundering prevention (see SYSC 6.3);(9) internal
BIPRU 9.1.6RRP
The risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which a firm is investor,3originator or sponsor, including reputational risks,3 must be evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure in particular that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in risk assessment and management decisions.[Note:BCD Annex V point 8]3
BIPRU 9.1.7GRP
A firm that is a party to a securitisation should fully understand the risks it has assumed or retained. In particular it should do so in order that it can correctly determine in accordance with BIPRU 9 the capital effects of the securitisation.
BIPRU 9.1.8GRP
The appropriate regulator expects an originator to continue to monitor any risks that it may be subject to when it has excluded the securitised exposures from its calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts. The originator should consider capital planning implications where risks may return and the impact that securitisation has on the quality of the remaining exposures held by the originator.
SUP 4.3.13RRP
An actuary appointed to perform the actuarial function must, in respect of those classes of the firm's long-term insurance business which are covered by his appointment1:1(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on1 the risks the firm runs in1 so far as they may have a material impact on the firm's ability to meet liabilities to policyholders in respect of long-term insurance contracts as they fall due and on the capital needed
SUP 4.3.15GRP
SUP 4.3.13 R is not intended to be exhaustive of the professional advice that a firm should take whether from an actuary appointed under this chapter or from any other actuary acting for the firm. Firms should consider what systems and controls are needed to ensure that they obtain appropriate professional advice on financial and risk analysis; for example:11(1) risk identification, quantification and monitoring;1(2) stress and scenario testing;1(3) ongoing financial conditions;1(4)
SUP 4.3.16DGRP
1Firms should normally obtain advice, from the actuary appointed to perform the with-profits actuary function in respect of the affected class or classes of with-profits business, whenever they are preparing to make key decisions based on the exercise of discretion affecting their with-profits business. Firms should also have risk management processes in place to ensure that all relevant matters are referred to the actuary for advice.
SYSC 8.1.3GRP
SYSC 4.1.1 R requires a firm to have effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report risks and internal control mechanisms. Except in relation to those functions described in SYSC 8.1.5 R, where a firm relies on a third party for the performance of operational functions which are not critical or important for the performance of relevant services and activities (see SYSC 8.1.1 R (1)) on a continuous and satisfactory basis, it should take into account, in a manner that
SYSC 8.1.8RRP
A common platform firm must in particular take the necessary steps to ensure that the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the service provider must have the ability, capacity, and any authorisation required by law to perform the outsourced functions, services or activities reliably and professionally;(2) the service provider must carry out the outsourced services effectively, and to this end the firm must establish methods for assessing the standard of performance of the service provider;(3)
SYSC 8.1.13RRP
6A management company must retain the necessary resources and expertise so as to monitor effectively the activities carried out by third parties on the basis of an arrangement with the firm, especially with regard to the management of the risk associated with those arrangements.[Note: article 5(2) of the UCITS implementing Directive]
COND 2.7.8GRP
1In deciding how they will satisfy and continue to satisfy the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2F and 3E of Schedule 6 to the Act, firms should consider matters including (but not limited to) the following:(1) the assumptions underlying the firm's business model and justification for it;(2) the rationale for the business the firm proposes to do or continues to do, its competitive advantage, viability and the longer-term profitability of the business;(3) the needs of
COND 2.7.10GRP
1Firms should consider scenarios which may negatively impact on the firm's business model with a view to ensuring the sustainability of the firm and, further, to consider the vulnerability of the business model to specific events and the risks and consequences that might arise. Where appropriate, this might include reverse stress-testing (see SYSC 20 ‘Reverse stress testing’). A firm should put in place a credible plan to minimise the risks that it identifies from, or in relation
COND 2.7.11GRP
1Firms should ensure that any adjustments to its business model:(1) are approved at an appropriate level in the business;(2) are considered in the light of any potential risks, impacts and consequences of the proposed changes; and(3) appropriately take into account the needs of and risks to clients and relevant consumers.
COLL 6.11.2RRP
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must establish and maintain a permanent risk management function.(2) The function referred to in (1) must be hierarchically and functionally independent from operating units, except where such independence would not be appropriate and proportionate in view of the nature, scale and complexity of the authorised fund manager’s or UK UCITS management company’s business and of
COLL 6.11.3GRP
Where the risk management function required under COLL 6.11.2 R (1) is not hierarchically and functionally independent, the authorised fund manager or UK UCITS management company should nevertheless be able to demonstrate that its risk management process satisfies the requirements of COLL 6.12.3 R (Risk management process) and that, in particular, the appropriate safeguards have been adopted.[Note: article 12(2) third paragraph and recital (12) of the UCITS implementing Dire
COLL 6.11.4RRP
(1) The permanent risk management function must:(a) implement the risk management policy and procedures;(b) ensure compliance with the risk limit system, including statutory limits concerning global exposure and counterparty risk, as required by COLL 5.2 (General investment powers and limits for UCITS schemes) and COLL 5.3 (Derivative exposure) or, where appropriate, the relevant UCITS Home State measures implementing articles 41, 42 and 43 of the UCITS implementing Directive;(c)
SYSC 19A.2.1RRP
A firm must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.[Note: Article 22(1) of the Banking Consolidation Directive]
SYSC 19A.2.2GRP
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should
SYSC 19A.2.3GRP
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only in relation to certain categories of employee. But the appropriate regulator would expect firms, in complying with the Remuneration Code general requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the appropriate regulator considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19A.3.40
SYSC 6.1.1RRP
1A firm must establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance of the firm including its managers, employees and appointed representatives (or where applicable, tied agents)3 with its obligations under the regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial crime.2[Note: article 13(2) of MiFID and article 12(1)(a) of the UCITS Directive]8242
SYSC 6.1.1AGRP
10The FCA provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime in FC (Financial crime: a guide for firms).
SYSC 6.1.2RRP
A common platform firm and a management company8 must, taking into4account the nature, scale and complexity of its business, and the nature and range of financial services and activities8 undertaken in the course of that business, establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures designed to detect any risk of failure by the firm to comply with its obligations under the regulatory system, as well as associated risks, and put in place adequate measures and procedures
SYSC 13.7.5GRP
IT systems include the computer systems and infrastructure required for the automation of processes, such as application and operating system software; network infrastructure; and desktop, server, and mainframe hardware. Automation may reduce a firm's exposure to some 'people risks' (including by reducing human errors or controlling access rights to enable segregation of duties), but will increase its dependency on the reliability of its IT systems.
SYSC 13.7.6GRP
A firm should establish and maintain appropriate systems and controls for the management of its IT system risks, having regard to:(1) its organisation and reporting structure for technology operations (including the adequacy of senior management oversight);(2) the extent to which technology requirements are addressed in its business strategy;(3) the appropriateness of its systems acquisition, development and maintenance activities (including the allocation of responsibilities
SYSC 13.7.9GRP
Operating processes and systems at separate geographic locations may alter a firm's operational risk profile (including by allowing alternative sites for the continuity of operations). A firm should understand the effect of any differences in processes and systems at each of its locations, particularly if they are in different countries, having regard to:(1) the business operating environment of each country (for example, the likelihood and impact of political disruptions or
GENPRU 3.1.1RRP
1(1) GENPRU 3.1 applies to every firm that is a member of a financial conglomerate other than:(a) an incoming EEA firm;(b) an incoming Treaty firm;(c) a UCITS qualifier; and(d) an ICVC.(2) GENPRU 3.1 does not apply to a firm with respect to a financial conglomerate of which it is a member if the interest of the financial conglomerate in that firm is no more than a participation.(3) GENPRU 3.1.25 R (Capital adequacy requirements: high level requirement), GENPRU 3.1.26 R (Capital
GENPRU 3.1.32GRP
GENPRU 3.1.35 R implements Article 7(4) and Article 8(4) of the Financial Groups Directive, which provide that where a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate, if any, shall apply to that sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company.
GENPRU 3.1.33GRP
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the appropriate regulator may impose such obligations
GENPRU 3.1.35RRP
Afirm must ensure that the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate referred to in GENPRU 3.1.34 R are complied with with respect to that financial sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company. The appropriate regulator'ssectoral rules for these purposes are those identified in the table in GENPRU 3.1.36 R.
DTR 4.1.8RRP
The management report must contain:(1) a fair review of the issuer's business; and(2) a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the issuer.
DTR 4.1.11RRP
The management report required by DTR 4.1.8 R must also give an indication of:(1) any important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year;(2) the issuer's likely future development;(3) activities in the field of research and development;(4) the information concerning acquisitions of own shares prescribed by Article 22 (2) of Directive 77/91/EEC;(5) the existence of branches of the issuer; and(6) in relation to the issuer's use of financial instruments and where
DTR 4.1.12RRP
(1) Responsibility statements must be made by the persons responsible within the issuer.(2) The name and function of any person who makes a responsibility statement must be clearly indicated in the responsibility statement.(3) For each person making a responsibility statement, the statement must set out that to the best of his or her knowledge:(a) the financial statements, prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accounting standards, give a true and fair view of the
BIPRU 4.1.10GRP
For the corporate exposure class there is a separate sub-class of specialised lending exposure. A firm may calculate risk weights for these exposures, where it is able to do so, in the same way as it does for the rest of its corporate exposure class, i.e. using the foundation IRB approach or the advanced IRB approach. Where a firm is not able to use this approach it may calculate risk weights for specialised lending exposures by slotting them into predetermined risk weights.
BIPRU 4.1.14GRP
(1) The appropriate regulator will only grant an IRB permission if it is satisfied that the firm's systems for the management and rating of credit risk exposures are sound and implemented with integrity and, in particular, that they meet the standards in BIPRU 4.2.2 R in accordance with the minimum IRB standards.(2) Under BIPRU 4.2.11 R, a firm applying for an IRB permission is required to demonstrate that it has been using for the IRB exposure classes in question rating systems
BIPRU 4.1.20GRP
By modifying GENPRU 2.1.51 R to allow the firm to use the IRB approach to calculate all or part of its risk weighted exposure amounts, the appropriate regulator is treating it like an application rule. The modification means that the provisions of BIPRU relating to the IRB approach supersede the rules relating to the standardised approach for exposures coming within the scope of the IRB permission.
BIPRU 9.11.4RRP
Subject to BIPRU 9.11.6 RBIPRU 9.11.12 R, the risk weighted exposure amount of an unratedsecuritisation position must be calculated by applying a risk weight of 1250%.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 point 7]
BIPRU 9.11.5RRP
For an originator or sponsor, the risk weighted exposure amounts calculated in respect of its positions in a securitisation may be limited to the risk weighted exposure amounts which would be calculated for the securitised exposures had they not been securitised subject to the presumed application of a 150% risk weight to all past due items and items belonging to regulatory high risk categories (see BIPRU 3.4.104 R and BIPRU 3 Annex 3 R) amongst the securitised exposures.[Note:BCD
BIPRU 9.11.6RRP
(1) A firm having an unratedsecuritisation position may apply the treatment set out in this paragraph for calculating the risk weighted exposure amount for that position provided the composition of the pool of exposuressecuritised is known at all times.(2) A firm may apply the weighted-average risk weight that would be applied to the securitised exposures referred to in (1) under the standardised approach by a firm holding the exposures multiplied by a concentration ratio.(3)