Related provisions for DTR 2.2.3
1 - 6 of 6 items.
An issuer and
its advisers are best placed to make an initial assessment of whether particular
information amounts to inside information.
The decision as to whether a piece of information is inside
information may be finely balanced and the issuer (with
the help of its advisers) will need to exercise its judgement.Note:DTR 2.7 provides additional guidance
on dealing with market rumour.
(1) Subject to the limited ability
to delay release of inside information to
the public provided by DTR 2.5.1 R, an issuer is
required to notify, via a RIS,
all inside information in its
possession as soon as possible.(2) If an issuer is
faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable
if it is necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding
announcement should be used where an issuer believes
that there is a danger of inside information
The FCA is aware that many issuers provide unpublished information to
third parties such as analysts, employees, credit rating agencies, finance
providers and major shareholders, often in response to queries from such parties.
The fact that information is unpublished does not in itself make it inside information. However, unpublished
information which amounts to inside information is
only permitted to be disclosed in accordance with the disclosure
rules and an issuer must
ensure
(1) Delaying disclosure of inside information will not always mislead
the public, although a developing situation should be monitored so that if
circumstances change an immediate disclosure can be made.(2) Investors understand that some
information must be kept confidential until developments are at a stage when
an announcement can be made without prejudicing the legitimate interests of
the issuer.
Behaviour, based on inside information relating to another company, in the context of a public takeover bid or merger for the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that company, does not of itself amount to market abuse (insider dealing) [Note: see Recital 29 Market Abuse Directive], including:(1) seeking from holders of securities, issued by the target, irrevocable undertakings or expressions of support to accept an offer to acquire those securities
(1) 5The Act provides that an individual who is not
a director can still be a person discharging managerial responsibilities in
relation to an issuer if they are a "senior executive of such an issuer"
and they meet the criteria set out in the Act.(2) 5An
individual may be a "senior executive of such an issuer" irrespective of the
nature of any contractual arrangements between the individual and the issuer and notwithstanding the absence of
a contractual arrangement between the