Related provisions for TC 2.1.2

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SYSC 19A.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
SYSC 19A.3.4RRP
(1) Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of an IFPRU investment firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC 19A1.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e.,
SYSC 19A.3.4AGRP
Where an overseas firm in SYSC 19A1.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e., an overseas firm that would have been a IFPRU investment firm if it had been a UK domestic firm) wishes to deem an employee who earns more than €750,000 not to be Remuneration Code staff, the overseas firm may apply for a waiver of the requirement in SYSC 19A.3.4R in respect of that employee.
SYSC 19A.3.5RRP
A firm must:(1) maintain a record of its Remuneration Code staff in accordance with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
SYSC 19A.3.14RRP
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note:3article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
SYSC 19A.3.15ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19A.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19A.3.29RRP
A firm must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47 R (1); and(3) 3when an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47
SYSC 19A.3.30RRP
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.(2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.[Note:3article 94(1)(p) of CRD and Standard 14 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
SYSC 19A.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator8 does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:8(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those
SYSC 19A.3.35RRP
A firm must ensure that the structure of an employee'sremuneration is consistent with and promotes effective risk management.
SYSC 19A.3.35ARRP
4A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:(1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and(2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance
SYSC 19A.3.37GRP
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance.
SYSC 19A.3.40RRP
A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.3 A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:3(1) 3it is exceptional;(2) 3it occurs in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff;3(3) 3the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and3(4) 3it is limited to the first year of service.[Note:3article 94(1)(d) and (e) of CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
SYSC 19A.3.40ARRP
3A firm must ensure that remuneration packages relating to compensation for, or buy out from, an employee's contracts in previous employment align with the long term interests of the firm and are subject to appropriate retention, deferral and performance and clawback arrangements.[Note: article 94(1)(i) of CRD]
SYSC 19A.3.43GRP
In the appropriate regulator's view, variable remuneration can be awarded to Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The appropriate regulator considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part
SYSC 19A.3.44RRP
A firm must set an 5appropriate ratio 5between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced;3(2) the level of the 5fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component3; and3(3) subject
SYSC 19A.3.44ARRP
3A firm may set a higher maximum level of the 5ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration provided:555(1) the overall level of the variable component does not exceed 200% of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each Remuneration Code staff; and55(2) is approved by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm in accordance with SYSC 19A.3.44B R.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]
SYSC 19A.3.44BRRP
A firm must ensure that any approval by the its shareholders or owners or members for the purposes of SYSC 19A.3.44AR is carried out in accordance with the following procedure:535(1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;55(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the
SYSC 19A.3.44DRRP
3A firm may apply a discount rate to a maximum of 25% of an employee's total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(iii) of CRD]
SYSC 19A.3.49RRP
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount, or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature,
SYSC 19A.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred
SYSC 19A.3.51ARRP
3A firm must:(1) ensure that any of the total variable remuneration is subject to malus or clawback arrangements;(2) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(3) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee: (a) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm;(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article
SYSC 19A.3.52ERP
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
SYSC 19A.3.54RRP
(1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules1 in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R1 apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:11(a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration); and(c) (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies at least one of the
SYSC 19A.3.55GRP
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the appropriate regulator to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified
SYSC 19D.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies in relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way, and to the extent, that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3)
SYSC 19D.3.4RRP
(1) Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of a dual-regulated firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC
SYSC 19D.3.5GRP
Where an overseas firm in SYSC 19D1.1.R(1)(d) (i.e., an overseas firm that would have been a dual-regulated firm if it had been a UK domestic firm) wishes to deem an employee who earns more than €750,000 not to be dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, the overseas firm may apply for a waiver of the requirement in SYSC 19D.3.4R in respect of that employee.
SYSC 19D.3.6RRP
A firm must:(1) maintain a record of its dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff under the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
SYSC 19D.3.15RRP
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and(3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced employees; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note: article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
SYSC 19D.3.16ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19D.3.18GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise, they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management
SYSC 19D.3.31RRP
A firm must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19D.3.56R(1); and(3) when an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19D.3.56R(1)
SYSC 19D.3.32RRP
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. (2) A firm must ensure that its employees do not use remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.(3) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.[Note:
SYSC 19D.3.36RRP
A firm must ensure that the structure of an employee's remuneration is consistent with, and promotes, effective risk management.
SYSC 19D.3.37RRP
A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:(1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility, as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and(2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance
SYSC 19D.3.40GRP
The non-financial criteria in SYSC 19D.3.39R(1)(b) should include the extent of the employee’s adherence to effective risk management, and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements.
SYSC 19D.3.42RRP
A firm must clearly explain the performance assessment process in SYSC 19D.3.39R to relevant employees.
SYSC 19D.3.44RRP
(1) A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.(2) A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:(a) it is exceptional;(b) it occurs in the context of hiring new dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff;(c) the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and(d) it is limited to the first year of service.[Note: article 94(1)(d) and (e) of the CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation
SYSC 19D.3.45RRP
A firm must ensure that remuneration packages relating to compensation for, or buy out from, an employee's contracts in previous employment align with its long-term interests including appropriate retention, deferral and performance and clawback arrangements.[Note: article 94(1)(i) of CRD]
SYSC 19D.3.46GRP
(1) Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same requirements applicable to variable remuneration awarded by the firm including deferral, malus and clawback.(2) The FCA expects that guaranteed variable awards and retention awards should not be common practice for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff and should be limited to rare, infrequent occurrences. The FCA expects a firm to provide prior notification to the FCA of any such proposed awards.
SYSC 19D.3.48RRP
A firm must set an appropriate ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; (2) the level of the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; and(3) subject to SYSC
SYSC 19D.3.49RRP
A firm may set a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration provided:(1) the overall level of the variable component does not exceed 200% of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff; and(2) is approved by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm in accordance with SYSC 19D.3.50R.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]
SYSC 19D.3.50RRP
A firm must ensure that any approval by its shareholders or owners or members, for the purposes of SYSC 19D.3.49R, is carried out in accordance with the following procedure: (1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the approval
SYSC 19D.3.52RRP
A firm may apply a discount rate to a maximum of 25% of an employee's total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(iii) of the CRD]
SYSC 19D.3.59RRP
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than:(a) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who do not perform a PRA-designated senior management function, three to five years, with no vesting taking place until one year after the award, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis.(b) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff
SYSC 19D.3.60GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares;(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio
SYSC 19D.3.61RRP
A firm must ensure that:(1) any variable remuneration, including a deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the firm as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the firm, the business unit and the individual concerned;(2) any variable remuneration is subject to clawback, such that it is only awarded if an amount corresponding to it can be recovered from the individual by the firm if the recovery is justified
SYSC 19D.3.62RRP
A firm must:(1) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(2) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee:(a) participated in, or was responsible for, conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm; or(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article 94(1)(n) of the CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards][Note: The FSA
SYSC 19D.3.63ERP
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
SYSC 19D.3.64RRP
(1) A firm must make all reasonable efforts to recover an appropriate amount corresponding to some or all vested variable remuneration where either of the following circumstances arise during the period in which clawback applies (including any part of such period occurring after the relevant employment has ceased):(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2)
SYSC 19D.3.67RRP
(1) Subject to (2) to (7), the rules in SYSC 19D Annex 1.1R to 1.6R apply in relation to the prohibitions on dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:(a) SYSC 19D.3.44R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19D.3.59R (non-deferred variable remuneration);(c) SYSC 19D.3.61R(2) (performance adjustment – clawback); and(d) SYSC 19D Annex 1.10R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(2) Paragraph (1) applies only to
SYSC 19D.3.68GRP
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enable the FCA to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision.(2) SYSC 19D.3.66R and SYSC 19D.3.67R (together with SYSC 19D Annex 1) are:(a) rules referred to in (1) that render void provisions of an agreement that contravene
TC 2.1.1RRP
(1) 13A firm must not assess an employee as competent to carry on an activity in TC Appendix 1 until the employee has demonstrated the necessary competence to do so and has (if required by TC Appendix 1) attained 16each module of an appropriate qualification16. This assessment need not take place before the employee starts to carry on the activity.14161613(2) A firm may assess an employee who is subject to, but has not satisfied, an appropriate qualification16requirement as competent
TC 2.1.3GRP
Firms should ensure that employees are appropriately supervised at all times. It is expected that the level and intensity of that supervision will be significantly greater in the period before the firm has assessed the employee as competent, than after. A firm should therefore have clear criteria and procedures relating to the specific point at which the employee is assessed as competent in order to be able to demonstrate when and why a reduced level of supervision may be considered
TC 2.1.4GRP

Firms should ensure that those supervising employees carrying on an activity in TC Appendix 1 have the necessary coaching and assessment skills as well as technical knowledge and experience17 to act as a competent supervisor and assessor. In particular firms should consider whether it is appropriate to require those supervising employees not assessed as competent to attain 16an appropriate qualification 16as well except where the employee is giving advice on retail investment products,17 see TC 2.1.5 R.

161617
TC 2.1.5RRP
Where an employee is giving advice on retail investment products17 to retail clients and has not been assessed as competent to do so, the firm must ensure that the individual supervising and assessing that employee has attained 16an appropriate qualification.1616171616
TC 2.1.6RRP
A firm must ensure that an employee does not carry on an activity in TC Appendix 1 (other than an overseeing activity) for which there is a qualification 16requirement without first attaining16 the relevant regulatory module 16of an appropriate qualification16.16
TC 2.1.7RRP
A firm must ensure that an employee does not carry on any of the following activities without first attaining 16each module of an appropriate qualification:1616(1) [deleted]1616(1A) 16advising on and dealing in securities which are not stakeholder pension schemes, personal pension schemes18 or broker funds;(1B) advising on and dealing in derivatives;(2) the activity of a broker fund adviser;(3) advising on syndicate participation at Lloyd's; or(4) the activity of a pension transfer
TC 2.1.8ARRP
17A firm must ensure that an employee who was assessed as competent as a retail investment adviser for the purposes of TC 2.1.1 R at 30 June 2009 does not carry on the activity of a retail investment adviser without first attaining an appropriate qualification.
TC 2.1.9RRP
(1) If a firm is satisfied that an employee meets the conditions in this rule then the requirements to have attained 16each module of an appropriate qualification 16will only apply if that employee is carrying on one of the activities specified in this rule.1616(2) The conditions are that a firm should be satisfied that an employee:(a) has at least three years' up-to-date relevant experience in the activity in question obtained while employed outside the United Kingdom;(b) has
TC 2.1.11GRP
Firms should ensure that their employees' training needs are assessed at the outset and at regular intervals (including if their role changes). Appropriate training and support should be provided to ensure that any relevant training needs are satisfied. Firms should also review at regular intervals the quality and effectiveness of such training.
TC 2.1.12RRP
A firm must review on a regular and frequent basis employees' competence and take appropriate action to ensure that they remain competent for their role.
TC 2.1.13GRP
A firm16should ensure that maintaining competence for an employee16takes into account such matters as: 1616(1) technical knowledge and its application;(2) skills and expertise; and(3) changes in the market and to products, legislation and regulation.
SYSC 19C.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
SYSC 19C.3.4RRP
BIPRU Remuneration Code staff comprises categories of staff including senior management, risk-takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk-takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile.
SYSC 19C.3.5RRP
A firm must: (1) maintain a record of its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in line with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the BIPRU Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
SYSC 19C.3.6GRP
  1. (1)

    In the FCA's view:

    1. (a)

      a firm's staff includes its employees;

    2. (b)

      a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;

    3. (c)

      the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;

    4. (d)

      firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;

      1
    5. (e)

      firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and

    6. (f)

      a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.

    [Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at

    http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code

    .]

  2. (2)

    High-level category

    Suggested business lines

    Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Fixed income

    Foreign exchange

    Commodities

    Securitisation

    Sales areas

    Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)

    Commercial banking

    Equities

    Structured finance

    Lending quality

    Trading areas

    Research

    Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Credit/market/operational risk

    Legal

    Treasury controls

    Human resources

    Compliance

    Internal audit

SYSC 19C.3.14RRP
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions: (1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated: (a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in line with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.
SYSC 19C.3.15ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19C.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19C.3.28GRP
Where a firm makes a loss, the FCA generally expects no variable remuneration to be awarded. Variable remuneration may nevertheless be justified, for example to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
SYSC 19C.3.29RRP
A firm must ensure that: (1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19C.3.47R (1); and(3) when employees reach retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments in SYSC 19C.3.47R (1) and subject
SYSC 19C.3.30RRP
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk-alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. (2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.
SYSC 19C.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
SYSC 19C.3.35RRP
A firm must ensure that the structure of an employee'sremuneration is consistent with, and promotes, effective risk management.
SYSC 19C.3.37GRP
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics, such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values, can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance.
SYSC 19C.3.39GRP
The requirement for assessment of performance to be in a multi-year framework reflects the fact that profits from a firm's activities can be volatile and subject to cycles. The financial performance of firms and individual employees can be exaggerated as a result. Performance assessment on a moving average of results can be a good way of meeting this requirement. However, other techniques, such as good quality risk adjustment and deferral of a sufficiently large proportion of
SYSC 19C.3.40RRP
A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless it: (1) is exceptional; (2) occurs in the context of hiring new BIPRU Remuneration Code staff; and(3) is limited to the first year of service.
SYSC 19C.3.41ERP
(1) A firm should not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration in hiring new BIPRU Remuneration Code staff (X) unless: (a) it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the remuneration is not more generous in its amount or terms (including any deferral or retention periods) than the variable remuneration awarded or offered by X’s previous employer; and(b) it is subject to appropriate performance adjustment requirements.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19C.3.43GRP
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
SYSC 19C.3.49RRP
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period of not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount; or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity
SYSC 19C.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
SYSC 19C.3.52ERP
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum: (a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
SYSC 19C.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
TC 2.2A.1RRP
(1) 1For the purposes of TC 2.1.1 R, if an employee carries on an activity in TC Appendix 1 (other than an overseeing activity), a firm must ensure that the employee attains an appropriate qualification within 30 months of starting to carry on that activity.(2) For the purposes of (1), a firm must record the date on which the employee starts to carry on that activity.
TC 2.2A.2RRP
For the purposes of calculating the 30 months referred to in TC 2.2A.1 R, a firm must:(1) aggregate periods of time spent carrying on the activity during different periods of employment; and(2) disregard any period of 60 business days or more during which the employee is not carrying on the activity due to being continuously absent from work.
TC 2.2A.3RRP
A firm must ensure that any employee who does not attain an appropriate qualification within the specified time:(1) ceases to engage in the activity to which that qualification would relate; and(2) does not resume that activity without first attaining an appropriate qualification.
TC 2.2A.4GRP
Firms may wish their employees to attain an appropriate qualification within an earlier time limit or to place limits on the number of times that qualification can be taken.
TC 2.2A.5GRP
Firms may wish employees who carry on an overseeing activity specified in TC Appendix 1 to attain an appropriate qualification within 30 months of starting the activity.
SYSC 19B.1.2RRP
An AIFM must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies and practices for AIFM Remuneration Code staff that are consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management and do not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profile of the instrument constituting the fund of the AIFs it manages.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
SYSC 19B.1.3RRP
AIFM Remuneration Code staff comprise those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the AIFMs or of the AIFs the AIFM manages. This includes senior management, risk takers, control functions, and any employees receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
SYSC 19B.1.4RRP
(1) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for AIFM Remuneration Code staff (inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits), an AIFM must comply with the AIFM remuneration principles in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to the requirement for significant AIFMs to have a remuneration committee (SYSC 19B.1.9 R).(3)
SYSC 19B.1.10RRP
An AIFM must ensure that employees engaged in control functions are compensated according to the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note: paragraph 1(e) of Annex II of AIFMD]
SYSC 19B.1.18AGRP
(1) 2£500,000 is a particularly high amount for the purpose of SYSC 19B.1.18R (4).(2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the possibility of lower sums being considered a particularly high amount.(3) Whilst any variable remuneration component of £500,000 or more paid to AIFM Remuneration Code staff should be subject to 60% deferral, firms should also consider whether lesser amounts should be considered to be 'particularly high', taking account, for example, of whether there
SYSC 19B.1.22RRP
An AIFM must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the AIFs it manages;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments in SYSC 19B.1.17R (1); and(3) in the case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred
SYSC 19B.1.23RRP
An AIFM must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.[Note: paragraph 1(q) of Annex II of AIFMD]
PERG 8.14.40AGRP
1Article 72 exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to a group personal pension scheme or a stakeholder pension scheme. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the financial promotion must inform the employee that the employer will make a contribution to the pension that the employee will receive from the pension scheme to which the financial promotion relates in the event of the employee becoming a member;(2) the employer
PERG 8.14.40AAGRP
6Article 72A exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a group personal pension scheme or a stakeholder pension scheme. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract
PERG 8.14.40ABGRP
6Article 72B exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to work-related insurance. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) where the provider of the insurance is not the employer, the employer must not receive or have received, any direct financial benefit (including any commission, discount, remuneration or reduction in premium) as a result of making the communication; and(2) where the communication is a non-real time financial
PERG 8.14.40ACGRP
6Article 72C exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to work-related insurance. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
PERG 8.14.40ADGRP
6Article 72D exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) where the provider of the staff mortgage is an undertaking in the same group as the employer, the employer must not receive or have received, any direct financial benefit (including any commission, discount, remuneration or reduction in premium) as a result of making the communication; and(2) where the communication
PERG 8.14.40AEGRP
6Article 72E exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
9Article 72F exempts any financial promotion which is made to an employee by or on behalf of a person in relation to an exempt staff loan. An exempt staff loan is defined as a credit agreement which is:(1) offered by a lender to a borrower as an incident of employment with the lender, or with an undertaking in the same group as the lender11; and(2) an exempt agreement under a provision of article 60G (exempt agreements: exemptions relating to the total charge for credit) of the
PERG 8.14.40AFGRP
6The exemptions described in PERG 8.14.40A G to PERG 8.14.40AEA G9 should enable employers (and their contracted service providers) to promote employee benefits packages that include any pension schemes, work-related insurance schemes,9staff mortgages and certain staff loans9 to employees without undue concern that they may be breaching the restriction in section 21 of the Act. PERG 8.14.34 G (Communications by employers and contracted service providers to employees) has further
PERG 8.14.40BGRP
1Article 73 exempts any financial promotion made by a person in the course of carrying out his duties as an adviser for, or employee of, an advice centre. This is provided the financial promotion relates to:(1) a home finance transaction; or2(2) rights under, or rights to or interests in rights under, a life policy; or(3) a child trust fund within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Child Trust Funds Act 2004.
TC 1.1.1RRP
3This sourcebook applies to a firm where its employee carries on an activity in TC App 1 for retail clients, customers or consumers (subject to the limitations set out in TC App 3).
TC 1.1.3GRP
The competent employees rule is the main Handbook requirement relating to the competence of employees. The purpose of this sourcebook is to support the FCA's supervisory function by supplementing the competent employees rule for retail activities.
TC 1.1.4GRP
In this sourcebook, competence means having the skills, knowledge and expertise needed to discharge the responsibilities of an employee's role. This includes achieving a good standard of ethical behaviour.22
LR 9.4.1RRP
(1) This rule applies to the following schemes of a listed company incorporated in the United Kingdom and of any of its major subsidiary undertaking (even if that major subsidiary undertaking is incorporated or operates overseas):(a) an employees' share scheme if the scheme involves or may involve the issue of new shares or the transfer of treasury shares; and(b) a long-term incentive scheme in which one or more directors of the listed company is eligible to participate.(2) The
LR 9.4.2RRP
LR 9.4.1 R does not apply to the following long-term incentive schemes:(1) an arrangement where participation is offered on similar terms to all or substantially all employees of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings whose employees are eligible to participate in the arrangement (provided that all or substantially all employees are not directors of the listed company); and(2) an arrangement where the only participant is a director of the listed company (or an
LR 9.4.4RRP
(1) This rule applies to the grant to a director or employee of a listed company or of any subsidiary undertaking of a listed company of an option to subscribe, warrant to subscribe or other similar right to subscribe for shares in the capital of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings.(2) A listed company must not, without the prior approval by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders of the listed company in a general meeting, grant the option, warrant or
LR 9.4.5RRP
LR 9.4.4 R does not apply to the grant of an option to subscribe, warrant to subscribe or other similar right to subscribe for shares in the capital of a listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings:(1) under an employees' share scheme if participation is offered on similar terms to all or substantially all employees of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings whose employees are entitled to participate in the scheme; or(2) following a take-over or reconstruction,
LR 8.6.5BGRP
7Situations when the FCA may impose restrictions or limitations on the services a sponsor can provide include (but are not limited to) where it appears to the FCA that: (1) the employees of the person applying to be a sponsor whom it is proposed will perform sponsor services have no or limited relevant experience and expertise of providing certain types of sponsor services or of providing sponsor services to certain types of company; or(2) the person applying to be a sponsor
LR 8.6.7RRP
A sponsor, or a 8person48applying for approval as a sponsor, will not satisfy LR 8.6.5R (2) unless it has:4888(1) 8submitted a sponsor declaration to the FCA:(a) for a person applying for approval as a sponsor, within three years of the date of its application; and(b) for a sponsor, within the previous three years; and(2) 8a sufficient number of employees with the skills , knowledge and expertise necessary for it to:(a) provide sponsor services in accordance with LR 8.3; (b)
LR 8.6.7AGRP
8To determine whether a sponsoror a person applying for approval as a sponsoris able to satisfy LR 8.6.7R (1)(a), the FCA may consider whether any of the person's employees have had material involvement in the provision of sponsor services that have required the submission of a sponsor declaration within the previous three years.
LR 8.6.7DGRP
8Notwithstanding LR 8.6.7C G, when considering whether a sponsor satisfies LR 8.6.7R (2)(c) the FCA expects a sponsor to have no less than two employees who are able to satisfy the key contact requirements in LR 8.6.19R (2).
LR 8.6.12RRP
8A sponsor or a person applying for approval as a sponsor will not satisfy LR 8.6.5R (3) unless it has in place:(1) clear and effective reporting lines for the provision of sponsor services (including clear and effective management responsibilities);(1A) effective systems and controls which require employees with management responsibilities for the provision of sponsor services to understand and apply the requirements of LR 8; (2) effective systems and controls for the appropriate
LR 8.6.20GRP
8The FCA expects an employee carrying out the role of key contact to have provided a sponsor service in the previous three years.
PERG 8.12.10GRP
Financial promotions other than unsolicited real time financial promotions are exempt where they follow up an earlier financial promotion which, in compliance with another exemption (such as that for promotions made to high net worth individuals or sophisticated investors – see PERG 8.14.21 G and PERG 8.14.27 G), contains certain indications or information. This is provided the financial promotion:(1) is made by the person who made or directed the earlier financial promotion;(2)
PERG 8.12.21GRP
Financial promotions made only to or directed only at certain types of person who are sophisticated enough to understand the risks involved are exempt. These are:(1) authorised persons;(2) exempt persons (where the financial promotion relates to a controlled activity which is a regulated activity for which the person is exempt);(3) governments and local authorities; and(4) persons whose ordinary business involves carrying on a controlled activity of the kind to which the financial
PERG 8.12.33GRP
The main purpose of the exemption appears to be to guard against the possibility that, during the course of a broadcast interview or a live website presentation, a financial promotion is made inadvertently by a director or employee of a company or other business undertaking when he is not acting in the capacity of a journalist (see PERG 8.12.25 G). The exemption applies if the financial promotion relates only to:(1) shares of the undertaking or of another undertaking in the same
PERG 8.12.34GRP
The exemption applies where the financial promotion:(1) comprises words which are spoken by the director or employee and not broadcast, transmitted or displayed in writing; or(2) is displayed in writing only because it is part of an interactive dialogue to which the director or employee is a party and in the course of which he is expected to respond immediately to questions put by a recipient of the communication.This is provided that the financial promotion is not part of an
PERG 8.12.35GRP
The exemption also requires that the director or employee is identified as such in the financial promotion before it is communicated.
PERG 8.12.37GRP
The second part of the exemption (referred to in PERG 8.12.34G (2)) envisages that the director or employee will be holding the equivalent of a conversation conducted in writing. Typically this will involve the exchange of e-mails. It is possible that this part of the exemption could be used by companies making so-called webcasts over the Internet. However, this would only be the case if the service through which the webcast is provided is a regularly updated news or information
REC 2.5A.2GRP
(1) The purposes of this section are to:(a) provide UK recognised bodies with guidance regarding the provisions of PIDA; and(b) Encourage UK recognised bodies to consider adopting and communicating to workers appropriate internal procedures for handling workers' concerns as part of an effective risk management system.(2) In this section "worker" includes, but is not limited to, an individual who has entered into a contract of employment.
REC 2.5A.4GRP
Under PIDA, any clause or term in an agreement between a worker and his employer is void in so far as it purports to preclude the worker from making a protected disclosure (that is, "blow the whistle").
REC 2.5A.5GRP
In accordance with section 1 of PIDA:(1) a "protected disclosure" is a qualifying disclosure which meets the relevant requirements set out in part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 19963;3(2) a "qualifying disclosure" is a disclosure, made in the public interest3, of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show that one or more of the following (a "failure") has been, is being, or is likely to be, committed:3(a) a criminal offence;
REC 2.5A.6GRP
(1) UK recognised bodies are encouraged to consider adopting appropriate internal procedures which will encourage their workers with concerns to blow the whistle internally about matters which are relevant to the functions of the FCA.22(2) In considering appropriate internal procedures, UK recognised bodiesmay find the guidance provided to firms in SYSC 18.2.2 G (2) and SYSC 18.2.2 G (3)1 helpful.1
SYSC 13.6.1GRP
A firm should consult SYSC 3.2.2 G to SYSC 3.2.5 G for guidance on reporting lines and delegation of functions within a firm and SYSC 3.2.13 G to SYSC 3.2.14 G for guidance on the suitability of employees and appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents1. This section provides additional guidance on management of employees and other human resources in the context of operational risk.
SYSC 13.6.2GRP
A firm should establish and maintain appropriate systems and controls for the management of operational risks that can arise from employees. In doing so, a firm should have regard to:(1) its operational risk culture, and any variations in this or its human resource management practices, across its operations (including, for example, the extent to which the compliance culture is extended to in-house IT staff);(2) whether the way employees are remunerated exposes the firm to the
SYSC 13.6.3GRP
A firm should ensure that all employees are capable of performing, and aware of, their operational risk management responsibilities, including by establishing and maintaining:(1) appropriate segregation of employees' duties and appropriate supervision of employees in the performance of their responsibilities (see SYSC 3.2.5 G);(2) appropriate recruitment and subsequent processes to review the fitness and propriety of employees (see SYSC 3.2.13 G and SYSC 3.2.14 G);(3) clear
SUP 10A.8.1RRP
The systems and controls function is the function of acting in the capacity of an employee of the firm with responsibility for reporting to the governing body of a firm, or the audit committee (or its equivalent) in relation to:(1) its financial affairs;(2) setting and controlling its risk exposure (see SYSC 3.2.10 G and SYSC 7.1.6 R);(3) adherence to internal systems and controls, procedures and policies (see SYSC 3.2.16 G and SYSC 6.2).
SUP 10A.8.4GRP
Where an employee performs the systems and controls function the FCA would expect the firm to ensure that the employee had sufficient expertise and authority to perform that function effectively. A director or senior manager would meet this expectation.
SUP 10A.8.5GRP
1For a full-scope UK AIFM, the requirement to have an employee responsible for reporting to the governing body of the firm or the audit committee for matters in SUP 10A.8.1R (2) and SUP 10A.8.1R (3) is derived from the AIFMD level 2 regulation, which imposes obligations on such firms to have a permanent risk management function and, where appropriate and proportionate for their business, an internal audit function.
DEPP 3.1.2GRP
(1) The RDC is separate from the FCA's2 executive management structure. Apart from its Chairman, none of the members of the RDC is an FCA2employee.22(2) All members of the RDC are appointed for fixed periods by the FCA2 Board. The FCA2 Board may remove a member of the RDC, but only in the event of that member's misconduct or incapacity.22
DEPP 3.1.3GRP
The RDC has its own legal advisers and support staff. The RDC staff are separate from the FCA2 staff involved in conducting investigations and making recommendations to the RDC.2
SYSC 3.2.3GRP
(1) A firm'sgoverning body is likely to delegate many functions and tasks for the purpose of carrying out its business. When functions or tasks are delegated, either to employees or to appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents8, appropriate safeguards should be put in place.(2) When there is delegation, a firm should assess whether the recipient is suitable to carry out the delegated function or task, taking into account the degree of responsibility involved.(3)
SYSC 3.2.5GRP
Where it is made possible and appropriate by the nature, scale and complexity of its business, a firm should segregate the duties of individuals and departments in such a way as to reduce opportunities for financial crime or contravention of requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the duties of front-office and back-office staff should be segregated so as to prevent a single individual initiating, processing and controlling transactions.
SYSC 3.2.7GRP
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate compliance function. The organisation and responsibilities of a compliance function should be documented. A compliance function should be staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent to perform their duties objectively. It should be adequately resourced and should have unrestricted access to the firm's relevant records as
SYSC 3.2.10GRP
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
SYSC 7.1.7BGRP
In setting the method of determining the remuneration of employees involved in the risk management function:(1) firms that SYSC 19D applies to will also need to comply with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code; and(2) firms that the remuneration part of the PRA Rulebook applies to will also need to comply with it.16513138
SYSC 7.1.7BAGRP
14In setting the method of determining the remuneration of employees involved in the risk management function full-scope UK AIFMs will need to comply with the AIFM Remuneration Code.
SYSC 7.1.7BBGRP
15In setting the method of determining the remuneration of employees involved in the risk management function, BIPRU firms will also need to comply with the BIPRU Remuneration Code.
SYSC 7.1.7BCGRP
In setting the method of determining the remuneration of employees involved in the risk management function, firms that SYSC 19A applies to will also need to comply with the Remuneration Code.
LR 13.8.11RRP
A circular to shareholders about the approval of an employee's share scheme or long-term incentive scheme must:(1) include either the full text of the scheme or a description of its principal terms;(2) include, if directors of the listed company are trustees of the scheme, or have a direct or indirect interest in the trustees, details of the trusteeship or interest;(3) state that the provisions (if any) relating to:(a) the persons to whom, or for whom, securities, cash or other
LR 13.8.13RRP
The resolution approving the adoption of an employees' share scheme or long-term incentive scheme may authorise the directors to establish further schemes based on any scheme which has previously been approved by shareholders but modified to take account of local tax, exchange control or securities laws in overseas territories, provided that any shares made available under such further schemes are treated as counting against any limits on individual or overall participation in
LR 13.8.14RRP
A circular to shareholders about proposed amendments to an employees' share scheme or a long-term incentive scheme must include:(1) an explanation of the effect of the proposed amendments; and(2) the full terms of the proposed amendments, or a statement that the full text of the scheme as amended will be available for inspection.
CASS 11.3.3GRP
CASS 11.3.4 R describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice bodies. As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4 R (in conjunction with SUP 10A.4.1 R and SUP 10A.7.10 R), in a CASS large debt management firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4 R is required to be discharged by a director