Related provisions for SYSC 19A.3.25

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(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the firm.[Note: Paragraph 23(a) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]
A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the firm.[Note: Paragraph 23(b) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]
A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy includes measures to avoid conflicts of interest.[Note: Paragraph 23(b) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]
SYSC 19A.3.10RRP
A firm must ensure that its governing body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for its implementation.[Note:Paragraph 23(c) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive and Standard 1 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
SYSC 19A.3.11RRP
A firm must ensure that the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note:Paragraph 23(d) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive and Standard 1 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
SYSC 19A.3.12RRP
(1) A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be
SYSC 19A.3.13GRP
(1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system.(2) The
SYSC 19A.3.15ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19A.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19A.3.23GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques, and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose.(2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those most appropriate
SYSC 19A.3.27RRP
A firm must ensure that its total variable remuneration is generally considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the firm occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned.[Note:Paragraph 23(q) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive and Standard 5 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
SYSC 19A.3.29RRP
A firm must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47 R (1); and(3) in the case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to
SYSC 19A.3.33GRP
Remuneration Principle 12 consists of a series of rules, evidential provisions and guidance relating to remuneration structures.
SYSC 19A.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FSA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those relating to:(a)
SYSC 19A.3.36RRP
A firm must ensure that where remuneration is performance-related:(1) the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of:(a) the individual; (b) the business unit concerned; and (c) the overall results of the firm; and(2) when assessing individual performance, financial as well as non-financial criteria are taken into account.[Note:Paragraph 23(g) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive and Standard 6 of the FSB Compensation
SYSC 19A.3.37GRP
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance.
SYSC 19A.3.38RRP
A firm must ensure that the assessment of performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the firm and its business risks.[Note: Paragraph 23(h) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]
SYSC 19A.3.42GRP
Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same deferral criteria as other forms of variable remuneration awarded by the firm.
SYSC 19A.3.44RRP
A firm must set appropriate ratios between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; and(2) the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component.[Note: Paragraph 23(l) of Annex
SYSC 19A.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FSA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
SYSC 19A.3.51RRP
A firm must ensure that any variable remuneration, including a deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the firm as a whole, and justified according tothe performance of the firm, the business unit and the individual concerned.[Note:Paragraph 23(q) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]
SYSC 19A.3.52ERP
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
SYSC 19A.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.(2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FSA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
1SYSC 19A Annex 1 makes provision about voiding and recovery.
SYSC 19A.3.54RRP
(1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules1 in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R1 apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:11(a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration); and(c) SYSC 19A Annex 1.7R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies
A firm must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.[Note: Article 22(1) of the Banking Consolidation Directive]
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only in relation to certain categories of employee. But the FSA would expect firms, in complying with the Remuneration Code general requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FSA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19A.3.40 R to SYSC 19A.3.43 G). (3) The
In line with the record-keeping requirements in SYSC 9, a firm should ensure that its remuneration policies, practices and procedures are clear and documented. Such policies, practices and procedures would include performance appraisal processes and decisions.
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the Third Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2010/76/EU)which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published
(1) The Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FSA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of
The FSA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FSA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FSA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
(1) An annual long report on an authorised fund, other than a scheme which is an umbrella, must contain:(a) the 3accounts for the annual accounting period which must be prepared in accordance with the requirements of the IMA SORP;(b) the report of the authorised fund manager in accordance with COLL 4.5.9 R (Authorised fund manager's report);(c) the comparative table in accordance with COLL 4.5.10 R (Comparative table);(d) the report of the depositary in accordance with COLL 4.5.11
(1) An authorised fund manager must, for each UCITS scheme which it manages, draw up a short document in English containing key investor information (a "key investor information document") for investors.(2) The words "key investor information" must be clearly stated in this document. (3) Key investor information must include appropriate information about the essential characteristics of the UCITS scheme which is to be provided to investors so that they are reasonably able to understand
SYSC 21.1.2GRP
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
SYSC 10.1.3RRP
A firm must take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest between:3(1) the firm, including its managers, employees and appointed representatives (or where applicable, 2tied agents)2, or any person directly or indirectly linked to them by control, and a client of the firm; or2(2) one client of the firm and another client;that arise or may arise in the course of the firm providing any service referred to in SYSC 10.1.1 R.[Note: article 18(1) of MiFID]
SYSC 3.2.18GRP
It is possible that firms' remuneration policies will from time to time lead to tensions between the ability of the firm to meet the requirements and standards under the regulatory system and the personal advantage of those who act for it. Where tensions exist, these should be appropriately managed.
SUP 4.5.5GRP
If the actuary2 is an employee of the firm, the ordinary incentives of employment, including profit-related pay, share options or other financial interests in the firm or any associate, give rise to a conflict of interest only where they are disproportionate, or exceptional, relative to those of other employees of equivalent seniority.2
(1) This paragraph provides guidance on BIPRU 4.2.2 R and in particular BIPRU 4.2.2 R (2).(2) The IRB approach as applicable to a firm should be an integral part of its business and risk management processes and procedures to the extent that credit risk is relevant to them. It should also have a substantial influence on its decision-making and actions.21(a) particular regard should be had to the use of the IRB approach in: (i) credit approval;(ii) individual and portfolio limit
BIPRU 11.5.18RRP
3A firm must disclose the following information, including regular, at least annual, updates, regarding its remuneration policy and practices for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile:(1) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, including if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services
This table belongs to COLL 4.2.2 R (Publishing the prospectus).Document status1A statement that the document is the prospectus of the authorised fund valid as at a particular date (which shall be the date of the document).Authorised fund2A description of the authorised fund including:(a) its name;(b)whether it is an ICVC or an AUT;173(ba)whether it is a UCITS scheme or a non-UCITS retail scheme;17(bb)a statement that unitholders are not liable for the debts of the authorised fund.(c)for