Related provisions for SUP 2.2.5
1 - 20 of 25 items.
The FSA will consider the full circumstances of each case when determining whether or not to take action for a financial penalty or public censure. Set out below is a list of factors that may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.(1) The nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach, including:(a) whether the breach was deliberate
When deciding whether to take action for market abuse or requiring or encouraging, the FSA may consider the following additional factors:(1) The degree of sophistication of the users of the market in question, the size and liquidity of the market, and the susceptibility of the market to market abuse.(2) The impact, having regard to the nature of the behaviour, that any financial penalty or public censure may have on the financial markets or on the interests of consumers:(a) a
The FSA's rules on systems and controls against money laundering are set out in SYSC 3.2 and SYSC 6.3. The FSA, when considering whether to take action for a financial penalty or censure in respect of a breach of those rules, will have regard to whether a firm has followed relevant provisions in the Guidance for the UK financial sector issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group.
The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with a firm's regulatory obligations rests with the firm itself. However, the FSA may take disciplinary action against an approved person where there is evidence of personal culpability on the part of that approved person. Personal culpability arises where the behaviour was deliberate or where the approved person's standard of behaviour was below that which would be reasonable in all the circumstances at the time of the conduct
In some cases it may not be appropriate to take disciplinary measures against a firm for the actions of an approved person (an example might be where the firm can show that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the breach). In other cases, it may be appropriate for the FSA to take action against both the firm and the approved person. For example, a firm may have breached the rule requiring it to take reasonable care to establish and maintain such systems and controls as are
In addition to the general factors outlined in DEPP 6.2.1 G, there are some additional considerations that may be relevant when deciding whether to take action against an approved person pursuant to section 66 of the Act. This list of those considerations is non-exhaustive. Not all considerations below may be relevant in every case, and there may be other considerations, not listed, that are relevant.(1) The approved person's position and responsibilities. The FSA may take into
The FSA will not discipline approved persons on the basis of vicarious liability (that is, holding them responsible for the acts of others), provided appropriate delegation and supervision has taken place (see APER 4.6.13 G and APER 4.6.14 G). In particular, disciplinary action will not be taken against an approved person performing a significant influence function simply because a regulatory failure has occurred in an area of business for which he is responsible. The FSA will
3In addition to the general factors outlined in DEPP 6.2.1 G, there are some additional considerations that the FSA will have regard to when deciding whether to take action against a person that performs a controlled function without approval contrary to section 63A of the Act.(1) The conduct of the person. The FSA will take into consideration whether, while performing controlled functions without approval, the person committed misconduct in respect of which, if he had been approved,
The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with Part VI of the Act, the Part 6 rules, the prospectus rules or a provision otherwise made in accordance with the Prospectus Directive or a requirement imposed under such provision rests with the persons identified in section 91(1) and section 91(1A) (Penalties for breach of Part 6 rules) of the Act respectively. Normally therefore, any disciplinary action taken by the FSA for contraventions of these obligations will in the
However, in the case of a contravention by a person referred to in section 91(1)(a) or section 91(1)(b)(i) or section 91(1A) of the Act ("P"), where the FSA considers that another person who was at the material time a director of P was knowingly concerned in the contravention, the FSA may take disciplinary action against that person. In circumstances where the FSA does not consider it appropriate to seek a disciplinary sanction against P (notwithstanding a breach of relevant requirements
The Principles are set out in PRIN 2.1.1 R. The Principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms under the regulatory system. The Principles derive their authority from the FSA's rule-making powers set out in section 138(General rule-making power) of the Act. A breach of a Principle will make a firm liable to disciplinary action. Where the FSA considers this is appropriate, it will discipline a firm on the basis of the Principles alone.
The Listing Principles are set out in LR 7. The Listing Principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of listed companies. The Listing Principles derive their authority from the FSA's rule making powers set out in section 73A(1) (Part 6 Rules) of the Act. A breach of a Listing Principle will make a listed company liable to disciplinary action by the FSA.
When deciding how to proceed in such cases, the FSA will examine the circumstances of the case, and consider, in the light of the relevant investigation, disciplinary and enforcement powers, whether it is appropriate for the FSA or another authority to take action to address the breach. The FSA will have regard to all the circumstances of the case including whether the other authority has adequate powers to address the breach in question.
In some cases, it may be appropriate for both the FSAand another authority to be involved, and for both to take action in a particular case arising from the same facts. For example, a breach of RIE rules may be so serious as to justify the FSA varying or cancelling the firm's Part IV permission, or withdrawing approval from approved persons, as well as action taken by the RIE. In such cases, the FSA will work with the relevant authority to ensure that cases are dealt with efficiently
The FSA will not take action against a person over behaviour which (a) conforms with the Takeover Code or rules of an RIE and (b) falls within the terms of any provision of the Code of Market Conduct which states that behaviour so conforming does not amount to market abuse. The FSA will seek the Takeover Panel's or relevant RIE's views on whether behaviour complies with the Takeover Code or RIE rules and will attach considerable weight to its views.
If any of the circumstances in DEPP 6.2.26 G apply, and the FSA considers that the use of its disciplinary powers under section 123 or section 129, or of its injunctive powers under section 381 or of its powers relating to restitution under section 383 or 384 is appropriate, it will not take action during an offer to which the Takeover Code applies except in the circumstances set out in DEPP 6.2.27 G.
(1) 1A person subject to enforcement action may agree to a financial penalty or other outcome rather than contest formal action by the FSA.(2) The fact that he does so will not usually obviate the need for a statutory notice recording the FSA's decision to take that action. Where, however, the person subject to enforcement action agrees not to contest the content of a proposed statutory notice, the decision to give that statutory notice will be taken by senior FSA staff.(3) The
Settlement discussions may take place at any time during the enforcement process if both parties agree. This might be before the giving of a warning notice, before a decision notice, or even after referral of the matter to the Tribunal. But the FSA would not normally agree to detailed settlement discussions until it has a sufficient understanding of the nature and gravity of the suspected misconduct or issue to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate outcome. Settlement
The terms of any proposed settlement:(1) will be put in writing and be agreed by FSA staff and the person concerned;(2) may refer to a draft of the proposed statutory notices setting out the facts of the matter and the FSA's conclusions; (3) may, depending upon the stage in the enforcement process at which agreement is reached, include an agreement by the person concerned to: (a) waive and not exercise any rights under sections 387 (Warning notices) and 394 (Access to Authority
In addition to the factors considered in Step 2 for cases against firms (DEPP 6.5A) and cases against individuals (DEPP 6.5B),1 the following considerations are relevant.1(1) In general, the FSA's approach to disciplinary action arising from the late submission of a report will depend upon the length of time after the due date that the report in question is submitted.(2) If the person concerned is an individual, it is open to him to make representations to the FSA as to why he
Some of the distinguishing features of notices given under enactments other than the Act are as follows: (1) Building Societies Act 1986, section 36A: There is no right to refer a decision to issue a prohibition order under section 36A to the Tribunal. Accordingly, a decision notice under section 36A(5A) is not required to give an indication of whether any such right exists. A decision notice under section 36A(5A) may only relate to the issue of a prohibition order under section
(1) 1The FSA's approach to determining penalties described in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5C is intended to ensure that financial penalties are proportionate to the breach. The FSA recognises that penalties may affect persons differently, and that the FSA should consider whether a reduction in the proposed penalty is appropriate if the penalty would cause the subject of enforcement action serious financial hardship.(2) Where an individual or firm claims that payment of the penalty proposed
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FSA will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FSA’s starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FSA believes
(1) The FSA will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FSA will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FSA will also take into account its regulatory objectives, for example in situations where
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty, or the length of any period of suspension or restriction,2 and other conditions which the FSA seeks to impose by way of such action. Such conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FSA recognises the benefits of such agreements, in that they offer the potential for securing earlier redress or protection for consumers
(1) Any settlement agreement between the FSA and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may be,
A sponsor must notify the FSA in writing as soon as possible if:(1) the sponsor ceases to satisfy the criteria for approval as a sponsor set out in LR 8.6.5 R; or(2) the sponsor, or any of its employees who provide sponsor services,5 are:5(a) convicted of any offence involving fraud, theft or other dishonesty; or(b) the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding, a receiving order or an administration order; or(3) any of its employees who providesponsor services5are disqualified by a
An overseas recognised body must include in the first report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act after the recognition order in relation to that overseas recognised body is made: (1) particulars of any events of the kind described in section 295(2) of the Act which occurred; (2) particulars of any change specified in REC 6.7.4 R (1) or disciplinary action specified in REC 6.7.4 R (2) which occurred; and(3) any annual report and accounts which covered a period ending; after
The power to impose a suspension or a restriction is a disciplinary measure which the FSA may use in addition to, or instead of, imposing a financial penalty or issuing a public censure. The principal purpose of imposing a suspension or a restriction is to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar breaches, and demonstrating
As the power to impose a suspension or a restriction is a disciplinary measure, where the FSA considers it necessary to take action, for example, to protect consumers from an authorised person, the FSA will seek to cancel or vary the authorised person'spermissions. If the FSA has concerns with a person's fitness to be approved, and considers it necessary to take action, the FSA will seek to prohibit the approved person or withdraw its approval.
When considering whether to nominate or approve a skilled person to make a report, the FSA will have regard to the circumstances of the case, including whether the proposed skilledperson appears to have:(1) the skills necessary to make a report on the matter concerned;(2) the ability to complete the report within the time expected by the FSA;(3) any relevant specialised knowledge, for instance of the person in SUP 5.2.1 G, the type of business carried on by the person in SUP 5.2.1
Consequently, the FSA considers that it will have good reason not to grant a firm's application for cancellation of permission where:(1) it proposes to exercise any of the powers described in SUP 6.4.24 G; or(2) it has already begun disciplinary and restitution proceedings against the firm by exercising either or both of these powers against the firm.
In determining whether a firm will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, threshold condition 5 in respect of conducting its business with integrity and in compliance with proper standards, the relevant matters, as referred to in COND 2.5.4 G (2), may include but are not limited to whether:(1) the firm has been open and co-operative in all its dealings with the FSA and any other regulatory body (see Principle 11 (Relations with regulators)) and is ready, willing and organised to comply
If the FSA gives a firm a waiver, then the relevant rule no longer applies to the firm. But:(1) if a waiver directs that a rule is to apply to a firm with modifications, then contravention of the modified rule could lead to FSA enforcement action and (if applicable) a right of action under section 150 of the Act (Actions for damages); and(2) if a waiver is given subject to a condition, it will not apply to activities conducted in breach of the condition, and those activities,
(1) When deciding whether to take enforcement action under Part 7 of the RCB Regulations, and what form that enforcement action should take, the FSA will consider all relevant factors, including:(a) the relevant factors on decisions to take action set out in DEPP 6.2.1 G;(b) whether any contractual or other arrangements agreed between the parties can be used effectively to address any perceived failure under the RCB Regulations; and(c) the interests of investors in the relevant
The FSA will consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction where it believes that such action will be a more effective and persuasive deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty alone. This is likely to be the case where the FSA considers that direct and visible action in relation to a particular breach is necessary. Examples of circumstances where the FSA may consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction include:(1) where the FSA (or
GEN 6.1.4A R,2GEN 6.1.5 R and GEN 6.1.6 R do not prevent a firm or member from entering into, arranging, claiming on or making any payment under a contract of insurance which indemnifies any person against all or part of the costs of defending FSA enforcement action or any costs they may be ordered to pay to the FSA.
The FSA expects to maintain a close working relationship with certain types of firm and expects that routine supervisory matters arising can be resolved during the normal course of this relationship by, for example, issuing individual guidance where appropriate (see SUP 9.3). However, the FSA may seek to vary a firm's Part IV permission:(1) in circumstances where it considers it appropriate for the firm to be subject to a formal requirement, breach of which could attract enforcement