Related provisions for SUP 2.1.7
1 - 16 of 16 items.
The FSA receives the information in SUP 2.1.3 G through a variety of means, including notifications by firms (see SUP 15) and regular reporting by firms (see SUP 16). This chapter is concerned with the methods of information gathering that the FSA may use on its own initiative in the discharge of its functions under the Act. This chapter does not deal with the information gathering powers that the FSA has under the Unfair Terms Regulations. These are dealt with in UNFCOG2.12
The purpose of SUP 2.3 is to amplify Principle 11 in the context of information gathering by the FSA on its own initiative in the discharge of its functions under the Act. SUP 2.3 therefore sets out, in guidance on Principle 11 and in rules, how the FSA expects firms to deal with the FSA in that context, including the steps that a firm should take with a view to ensuring that certain connected persons should also cooperate with the FSA.
The FSA uses various methods of information gathering on its own initiative which require the cooperation of firms:(1) Visits may be made by representatives or appointees of the FSA. These visits may be made on a regular basis, on a sample basis, for special purposes such as theme visits (looking at a particular issue across a range of firms), or when the FSA has a particular reason for visiting a firm. Appointees of the FSA may include persons who are not FSA staff, but who have
The FSA will have regard to the objectives of its enquiries, and the relative effectiveness of its available powers to achieve those objectives. For example:(1) historic information or evidence: if the objectives are limited to gathering historic information, or evidence for determining whether enforcement action may be appropriate, the FSA's information gathering and investigation powers under sections 165 (Authority's power to require information), 167 (Appointment of persons
In accordance with its general policy the FSA will have regard to the question of cost, which is particularly pertinent in relation to skilled persons because:(1) if the FSA uses the section 166 power (Reports by skilled persons) the firm will appoint, and will have to pay for the services of, the skilled person;(2) if the FSA uses its other information gathering and investigation powers, it will either authorise or appoint its own staff to undertake the information gathering
The FSA would not normally seek to gather information using the methods described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4 in a situation where the FSA could not have obtained it under the powers in Part XI of the Act (Information Gathering and Investigations). In particular, the limitations in the following sections of the Act are relevant to this chapter:(1) section 175(5) (Information and documents: supplementary powers) under which no person may be required under Part XI of the Act (Information
When the FSA obtains confidential information using the methods of information gathering described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4, it is obliged under Part XXIII of the Act (Public Record, Disclosure of Information and Co-operation) to treat that information as confidential. The FSA will not disclose confidential information without lawful authority, for example if an exception applies under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disclosure of Confidential Information) Regulations
A firm should satisfy itself that the terms of the contract with its appointed representative (including an introducer appointed representative):(1) are designed to enable the firm to comply properly with any limitations or requirements on its own permission;(2) require the appointed representative to cooperate with the FSA as described in SUP 2.3.4 G (Information gathering by the FSA on its own initiative: cooperation by firms) and give access to its premises, as described in
(1) The purpose of the precautionary measure rule is to ensure that an incoming EEA firm is subject to the standards of MiFID and the MiFID implementing Directive to the extent that the Home State has not transposed MiFID or the MiFID implementing Directive by 1 November 2007. It is to 'fill a gap'.(2) The rule is made in the light of the duty of the United Kingdom under Article 62 of MiFID to adopt precautionary measures to protect investors. (3) The rule will be effective for