Related provisions for GENPRU 2.2.165
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The internal control mechanisms referred to in SYSC 12.1.8 R must include:(1) mechanisms that are adequate for the purpose of producing any data and information which would be relevant for the purpose of monitoring compliance with any prudential requirements (including any reporting requirements and any requirements relating to capital adequacy, solvency, systems and controls and large exposures):(a) to which the firm is subject with respect to its membership of a group; or(b)
If this rule applies under SYSC 12.1.14 R to a firm, the firm must:(1) comply with SYSC 12.1.8R (2) in relation to any UK consolidation group or non-EEAsub-group of which it is a member, as well as in relation to its group; and(2) ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any consolidation group or non-EEAsub-group of which it is a member comply with the obligations set out in the following provisions on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated)
In some cases the management of the systems and controls used to address the risks described in SYSC 12.1.8R (1) may be organised on a group-wide basis. If the firm is not carrying out those functions itself, it should delegate them to the group members that are carrying them out. However, this does not relieve the firm of responsibility for complying with its obligations under SYSC 12.1.8R (1). A firm cannot absolve itself of such a responsibility by claiming that any breach
SYSC 12.1.8R (1) deals with the systems and controls that a firm should have in respect of the exposure it has to the rest of the group. On the other hand, the purpose of SYSC 12.1.8R (2) and the rules in this section that amplify it is to require groups to have adequate systems and controls. However a group is not a single legal entity on which obligations can be imposed. Therefore the obligations have to be placed on individual firms. The purpose of imposing the obligations
The FCA expects that a firm will only be compliant with the calibration requirements relating to model philosophy if it can demonstrate that:(1) the model philosophy is clearly articulated and justified. Justification should include analysis of the performance of assets, and the corresponding ratings assigned, over a change in economic conditions (ie, as long as period as possible); and(2) in addition to encapsulating this information in a coherent way in the calibration, the
The FCA expects that, as most models of this type will be able to produce one-year estimates of PD that correspond closely to point-in-time estimates, firms should conduct robust back-testing of such estimates by comparing them with realised default rates. Firms would need to demonstrate that the results of such back-testing meet pre-defined and stringent standards in order for the FCA to be satisfied that the IRB requirements are met.
The FCA also expects that a firm will be compliant with the validation requirements only where1it can demonstrate that:11(1) appropriate stability metrics should be considered across a range of economic environments (ie, longest period possible including most recent data);(2) the tolerances for the degree of divergence, and associated actions for what should happen when they are not met, is pre-defined; and(3) subsections of portfolios by characteristics affecting risk profile,
A firm must not apply any advanced prudential calculation approach for the purposes of this chapter unless it has an advanced prudential calculation approach permission and that advanced prudential calculation approach permission requires the firm to use that advanced prudential calculation approach for those purposes.
Even if a firm has an advanced prudential calculation approach permission that allows it to use an advanced prudential calculation approach for the purposes of this chapter, the firm may not use the requirements of another state or territory to the extent they provide for that advanced prudential calculation approach. Therefore a firm may not use BIPRU 8.7.34 R and 2BIPRU 8.7.37 R2 (Use of the capital requirements of another EEA competent authority)2 if that would involve using
(1) This paragraph gives guidance on some of the terms used in the overall Pillar 2 rule.(2) Insurance risk refers to the inherent uncertainties as to the occurrence, amount and timing of insurance liabilities.(3) Interest rate risk in the non-trading book is explained in BIPRU 2.3 (Interest rate risk in the non-trading book).(4) In a narrow sense, business risk is the risk to a firm that it suffers losses because its income falls or is volatile relative to its fixed cost base.
A firm may wish to consider the following scenarios:(1) one in which the firm gets into difficulties with an effect on its ability to fund the pension scheme; and(2) one in which the pension scheme position deteriorates (for example, because investment returns fall below expected returns or because of increases in life expectancy) with an effect on the firm's funding obligations; taking into account the management actions the firm could and would take.
6A firm is expected to determine where the scope of any stress test impacts upon its pension obligation risk and estimate how the relevant measure of pension obligation risk will change in the scenario in question. For example, in carrying out stress tests under GENPRU 1.2.42 R a firm must consider how a stress scenario, such as an economic recession, would impact on the firm's current obligations towards its pension scheme and any potential increase in those obligations. Risks
A firm should consider issues such as:(1) the extent to which trustees of the pension scheme or a pension regulator (such as the one created under the Pensions Act 2004) can compel a certain level of contributions or a one-off payment in adverse financial situations or in order to meet the minimum legal requirements under the scheme's trust deed and rules or under the applicable laws relating to the pension scheme;(2) whether the valuation bases used to set pension scheme contribution
As SYSC 3.2.4 G explains, a firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations and should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions. This section provides additional guidance on managing outsourcing arrangements (and will be relevant, to some extent, to other forms of third party dependency) in relation to operational risk. Outsourcing may affect a firm's exposure to operational risk through significant changes to, and reduced control over, people,
Before entering into, or significantly changing, an outsourcing arrangement, a firm should:(1) analyse how the arrangement will fit with its organisation and reporting structure; business strategy; overall risk profile; and ability to meet its regulatory obligations;(2) consider whether the agreements establishing the arrangement will allow it to monitor and control its operational risk exposure relating to the outsourcing;(3) conduct appropriate due diligence of the service
In negotiating its contract with a service provider, a firm should have regard to:(1) reporting or notification requirements it may wish to impose on the service provider;(2) whether sufficient access will be available to its internal auditors, external auditors or actuaries (see section 341 of the Act) and to the FCA2 (see SUP 2.3.5 R (Access to premises) and SUP 2.3.7 R (Suppliers under material outsourcing arrangements);(3) information ownership rights, confidentiality
1A common platform firm must:(1) when relying on a third party for the performance of operational functions which are critical for the performance of regulated activities, listed activities or ancillary services (in this chapter "relevant services and activities") on a continuous and satisfactory basis, ensure that it takes reasonable steps to avoid undue additional operational risk; and7(2) not undertake the outsourcing of important operational functions in such a way as to impair
For the purposes of this chapter an operational function is regarded as critical or important if a defect or failure in its performance would materially impair the continuing compliance of a firm (other than a common platform firm)7 with the conditions and obligations of its authorisation or its other obligations under the regulatory system, or its financial performance, or the soundness or the continuity of its relevant services and activities.7
If a firm (other than a common platform firm)7 outsources critical or important operational functions or any relevant services and activities, it remains fully responsible for discharging all of its obligations under the regulatory system and must comply, in particular, with the following conditions:2(1) the outsourcing must not result in the delegation by senior personnel of their responsibility;(2) the relationship and obligations of the firm towards its clients under the regulatory system
This chapter (the custody rules) applies to a firm:21(1) [deleted]22(a) [deleted]22(b) [deleted]22(1A) 2when it holds financial instruments belonging to a client in the course of its MiFID business;7(1B) 2when it is safeguarding and administering investments, in the course of business that is not MiFID business;7(1C) when it is acting as trustee or depositary of an AIF; 79(1D) when it is acting as trustee or depositary of a UCITS; and97(1E) in respect of any arrangement for a
The appropriate regulator does not assume that all portfolios are sensitive to downturns. The appropriate regulator also accepts that for some portfolios, particularly in unsecured lending, the impact of the material drivers on LGD may be weak. However the burden is on the firm to demonstrate that its models are appropriate for the circumstances in which they are applied.
In the appropriate regulator's view a sub-portfolio consisting of credit card or overdraft obligations will usually meet the condition in BIPRU 4.6.44 R (2)(f). In the appropriate regulator's view it is unlikely that any other type of retail exposure will do so. If a firm wishes to apply the treatment in BIPRU 4.6.44 R (1) to product types other than credit card or overdraft obligations it should first discuss this with the appropriate regulator.
In relation to the obligation to substitute described in GENPRU 2.2.129R (2), a firm must take all reasonable steps to ensure that it has at all times authorised and unissued capital instruments which are core tier one capital8 (and the authority to issue them) sufficient to discharge its obligation to substitute.8
(1) This rule deals with any transaction:(a) under which an SPV directly or indirectly funds the subscription for capital issued by the firm as described in GENPRU 2.2.124 R; or(b) that is directly or indirectly funded by a transaction in (1)(a).(2) Each undertaking that is a party to a transaction to which this rule applies (other than the firm) must be a subsidiary undertaking of the firm.(3) Each SPV that is a party to a transaction to which this rule applies must comply with
A tier two instrument may be redeemable at the option of the firm, but any term of the instrument providing for the firm to have the right to exercise such an option must not provide for that right to be exercisable earlier than the fifth anniversary of the date of issue of the instrument.
A firm (other than a common platform firm)5 must arrange for orderly records to be kept of its business and internal organisation, including all services and transactions undertaken by it, which must be sufficient to enable the FCA5 or any other relevant competent authority under 5the UCITS Directive4 to monitor the firm's compliance with the requirements under the regulatory system, and in particular to ascertain that the firm has complied with all obligations with respect to
(1) 5A common platform firm must arrange for records to be kept of all services, activities and transactions undertaken by it. (2) The records in (1) must be sufficient to enable the FCA to fulfil its supervisory tasks and to perform the enforcement actions under the regulatory system including MiFID, MiFIR and the Market Abuse Regulation, and in particular to ascertain that the common platform firm has complied with all obligations including those with respect to clients or potential
The5 following factors may5 be taken into account in determining whether or not refraining from action indicates behaviour5 which falls under the scope of the Market Abuse Regulation,5 and are indications that it does:(1) if the person concerned has failed to discharge a legal or regulatory obligation (for example to make a particular disclosure) by refraining from acting; or(2) if the person concerned has created a reasonable expectation of him acting in a particular manner,
5In determining whether there is a pending order 5 for a client in relation to article 7(1)(d) of the Market Abuse Regulation, a factor that may be taken into account is5 if a person is approached by another in relation to a transaction, and:53(1) the transaction is not immediately executed on an arm's length basis in response to a price quoted by that person; and(2) the person concerned has taken on a legal or regulatory obligation relating to the manner or timing
(1) 2The UCITS Remuneration Code (SYSC 19E) also applies to a BIPRU firm that is a UK UCITS management company (that is, a UK UCITS management company that is a UCITS investment firm subject to BIPRU).(2) A BIPRU firm that is a UK UCITS management company will meet its obligations under SYSC 19C and SYSC 19E by complying with SYSC 19E. (3) Under (1) and (2), the FCA will not require the UK UCITS management company to demonstrate compliance with SYSC 19C.
(1) This rule applies to a firm that is unable to comply with the BIPRU Remuneration Code because of an obligation it owes to a BIPRU Remuneration Code staff member under a provision of an agreement made on or before 29 July 2010. (2) A firm must take reasonable steps to amend or terminate the provision in (1) in a way that enables it to comply with the BIPRU Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.(3) Until the provision in (1) ceases to prevent the firm from complying
Exposures fully and completely secured, to the satisfaction of the firm, by shares in Finnish residential housing companies, operating in accordance with the Finnish Housing Company Act of 1991 or subsequent equivalent legislation, in respect of residential property which is or shall be occupied or let by the owner must be assigned a risk weight of 35%.[Note: BCD Annex VI Part 1 point 46]
The Banking Consolidation Directive permits a competent authority to disapply the condition in BIPRU 3.4.60 R (3), if it has evidence that a well-developed and long-established residential real estate market is present in its territory with loss rates which are sufficiently low to justify such treatment. BIPRU 3.4.61 R implements that option. However, if the evidence changes so that these conditions are no longer satisfied, the appropriate regulator may be obliged to revoke BIPRU
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers
(1) If a consumer notifies a firm that they wish to discharge their obligations under an MCD regulated mortgage contract prior to its expiry, the firm must provide the consumer, without delay, with the information necessary to allow them to consider that option.(2) The information under (1) must:(a) quantify the implications for the consumer of discharging their obligations prior to the expiry of the MCD regulated mortgage contract; and (b) clearly set out any assumptions that
(1) An MCD mortgage lender must give a consumer who enters into an MCD regulated mortgage contract the right to discharge fully or partially his obligations under that MCD regulated mortgage contract prior to its expiry.(2) If the consumer exercises the right in (1), the MCD mortgage lender must reduce the total cost of the credit to the consumer by an amount equal to the interest and costs for the remaining duration of the MCD regulated mortgage contract.[Note: article 25(1)
Money ceases to be client money if:(1) it is paid to the client, or a duly authorised representative of the client; or(2) it is:(a) paid to a third party on the instruction of the client, or with the specific consent of the client; or(b) paid to a third party further to an obligation on the firm under any applicable law; or(3) it is paid into an account of the client (not being an account which is also in the name of the firm) on the instruction, or with the specific consent,
(1) A non-UCITS retail scheme operating as a FAIF must not invest in units in schemes in COLL 5.7.7R (1) to (3) (‘second schemes’) unless the authorised fund manager has carried out appropriate due diligence on each of the second schemes and:(a) is satisfied, on reasonable grounds and after making all reasonable enquiries, that each of the second schemes complies with relevant legal and regulatory requirements;(b) has taken reasonable care to determine that:(i) the property of
An authorised fund manager carrying out due diligence for the purpose of the rules in this section should make enquiries or otherwise obtain information needed to enable him properly to consider:(1) whether the experience, expertise, qualifications and professional standing of the second scheme's investment manager is adequate for the type and complexity of the second scheme;(2) the adequacy of the regulatory, legal and accounting regimes applicable to the second scheme and its