Related provisions for COBS 20.2.55
1 - 9 of 9 items.
(1) 2The aim of the discussions in COBS 20.2.41A R is to:(a) allow the FCA to comment on the adequacy of the firm's planning; and(b) seek agreement with the firm on any other appropriate actions to ensure with-profits policyholders are treated fairly.(2) If the firm is no longer effecting a material volume of new with-profits policies (other than by reinsurance) into a with-profits fund; or if it is ceding by way of reinsurance most or all of the new with-profits policies which
A firm that is seeking to make a reattribution of its inherited estate must:(1) first discuss with the FCA7 (as part of its determination under COBS 20.2.21 R):227(a) its projections for capital required to support existing business, which must include an assessment of:2(i) the firm's future risk appetite for the with-profits fund and other relevant business; and2(ii) how much of the margin for prudence can be identified as excessive and removed from the projected capital requirements;
The firm should include an independent element in the policyholder advocate selection process, which may include consulting representative groups of policyholders or using the services of a recruitment consultant. When considering an application for approval of a nominee to perform the policyholder advocate role, the FCA will have regard to the extent to which the firm has involved others in the selection process.
The precise role of the policyholder advocate in any particular case will depend on the nature of the firm and the reattribution proposed. A firm will need to discuss, with a view to agreeing,2 with the FCA the precise role of the policyholder advocate in a particular case (COBS 20.2.45 R). However, the role of the policyholder advocate should include:(1) negotiating with the firm, on behalf of the relevant with-profits policyholders, the benefits to be offered to them in exchange
A firm must:(1) notify the FCA of the terms on which it proposes to appoint a policyholder advocate (whether or not the candidate was nominated by the FCA); and(2) ensure that the terms of appointment for the policyholder advocate:(a) include a description of the role of the policyholder advocate as agreed with the FCA under COBS 20.2.44 G;2(aA) stress the independent nature of the policyholder advocate's appointment and function, and are consistent with it;2(b) define the relationship
(1) 4A mutual operating a common fund may seek to undertake an exercise to identify that part of the fund to which the mutual considers it would be fair for relevant provisions in COBS 20 not to apply. (2) To give regulatory effect to the identification exercise, the FCA expects that a mutual will need to apply to the FCA to modify the relevant provisions in COBS 20 and elsewhere which are dependent on the definition of the with-profits fund. (3) A mutual will need to demonstrate
A firm's execution policy should determine the relative importance of each of the execution factors or establish a process by which the firm will determine the relative importance of the execution factors. The relative importance that the firm gives to those execution factors must be designed to obtain the best possible result for the execution of its client orders. Ordinarily, the FCA would expect that price will merit a high relative importance in obtaining the best possible
An example of a good or service 3relating to the execution of trades that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) is post-trade analytics. These would not meet the evidential criteria for a good or service to be directly related to the execution of trades under COBS 11.6.4E (1).33
Examples of goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) include price feeds or historical price data that have not been analysed or manipulated in order to present the investment manager with meaningful conclusions. These would not meet the evidential criteria for a good or service to amount to the provision of substantive research under COBS 11.6.5E
Examples of goods or services that relate to the execution of trades or the provision of research that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of either evidential provisions COBS 11.6.4E (1) or COBS 11.6.5E (1)3 include:3(1) services relating to the valuation or performance measurement of portfolios;(2) computer hardware; (3) connectivity services such as electronic networks and dedicated telephone lines; (4) seminar fees;(4A) 3corporate access services;3(5) subscriptions
The reference to substantive 3research in the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) is not confined to investment research as defined in the Glossary. Substantive research can potentially be or include investment research, but this is not part of the criteria under COBS 11.6.5 E.3 In addition, any goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FCA regards as not acceptable under COBS 11.6.7 G or COBS 11.6.8 G3 should be viewed as not meeting the
In assessing the adequacy of prior and periodic disclosures made by an investment manager under this section, the FCA will have regard to the extent to which the investment manager adopts disclosure standards developed by industry associations such as the Investment Management Association, the National Association of Pension Funds and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe.
The FCA would expect a firm'sconflicts of interest policy to provide for investment research to be published or distributed to its clients in an appropriate manner. For example, the FCA considers it will be:(1) appropriate for a firm to take reasonable steps to ensure that its investment research is published or distributed only through its usual distribution channels; and(2) inappropriate for an employee (whether or not a financial analyst) to communicate the substance of any
The FCA would expect a firm to consider whether or not other business activities of the firm could create the reasonable perception that its investment research may not be an impartial analysis of the market in, or the value or prospects of, a financial instrument. A firm would therefore be expected to consider whether its conflicts of interest policy should contain any restrictions on the timing of the publication of investment research. For example, a firm might consider whether
The FCA considers that the significant conflicts of interest which could arise are likely to mean it is inappropriate for a financial analyst or other relevant person to prepare investment research which is intended firstly for internal use for the firm's own advantage, and then for later publication to its clients (in circumstances in which it might reasonably be expected to have a material influence on its clients' investment decisions).
(1) COBS 11.8.8R (2) includes conversations and communications relating to specific transactions which are intended to lead to the conclusion of an agreement by the firm to deal with or on behalf of the client as principal or agent, even if those conversations or communications do not lead to the conclusion of such an agreement. It does not include conversations or communications which are not intended to lead to the conclusion of such an agreement, such as general conversations
A firm must take reasonable steps to retain all records made by it under COBS 11.8.5 R:(1) for a period of at least 6 months from the date the record was created;(2) in a medium that allows the storage of the information in a way accessible for future reference by the FCA, and so that the following conditions are met:(a) the FCA must be able to access the records readily;(b) it must be possible for any corrections or other amendments, and the contents of the records prior to such
(1) The FCA expects that a with-profits committee will meet at least quarterly and ad hoc if required. (2) The FCA expects that, in general, a with-profits committee or advisory arrangement will work closely with the with-profits actuary, and obtain his opinion and input as appropriate.
(1) The FCA expects the governing body of the firm to decide whether a member of the with-profits committee or a person (other than a non-executive director) carrying out the advisory arrangement is independent. The FCA expects a firm'sgoverning body to adopt the following approach and have regard to the following factors when making this assessment:(a) the governing body should determine whether the person is independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships
Where article 20(3) of the Market Abuse Regulation requires a disclosure of the proportions of all investment recommendations published that are “buy”, “hold”, “sell” or equivalent terms, the FCA considers it important for these equivalent terms to be consistent and meaningful to the recipients in terms of the course of actions being recommended, particularly for non-equity material.22