Related provisions for LR 20.5.1
61 - 80 of 119 items.
(1) The FCA may, at any time, require an issuer to publish such information in such form and within such time limits as it considers appropriate to protect investors or to ensure the smooth operation of the market.(2) If an issuer fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (1) the FCA may itself publish the information (after giving the issuer an opportunity to make representations as to why it should not be published).
(1) In the FCA’s opinion, paragraph 5(1)(8)(a) of the ESMA MAR delayed disclosure guidelines does3 not envisage that an issuer will: 2(a) delay public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the negotiations to deal with such a situation; or2(b) delay disclosure of inside information on the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation will be jeopardised
1In considering whether the functions the person performs would ordinarily be performed by officers of the issuer, the FCA will consider, among other things:(1) the nature of the board of the issuer to which the person provides services, and whether the board has the capability to act itself on strategic matters in the absence of that person's services; (2) whether the appointment relates to a one-off transaction or is a longer term relationship; and(3) the proportion of the functions
(1) When deciding whether to take enforcement action under Part 7 of the RCB Regulations, and what form that enforcement action should take, the FCA will consider all relevant factors, including:(a) the relevant factors on decisions to take action set out in DEPP 6.2.1 G;(b) whether any contractual or other arrangements agreed between the parties can be used effectively to address any perceived failure under the RCB Regulations; and(c) the interests of investors in the relevant
When considering whether to impose a financial penalty, the amount of penalty, and whether to impose the penalty on the issuer or the owner, the FCA will have regard, where relevant,1 to:(1) the statement on determining the appropriate level of a financial penalty set out 1in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D1;(2) the particular arrangements between the issuer and the owner; (3) the likely impact of the penalty on the interests of investors in a regulated covered bond; and(4) the conduct
(1) If the FCA considers that an issuer, a person discharging managerial responsibilities or a connected person has breached any of the disclosure requirements2 it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty or publish a statement censuring that person.(2) If the FCA considers that a former director was knowingly concerned in a breach by an issuer it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty
(1) The FCA may dispense with, or modify, the transparency rules in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it considers appropriate (subject to the terms of directives and the Act).(2) A dispensation or modification may be either unconditional or subject to specified conditions.(3) If an issuer, or other person has applied for, or been granted, a dispensation or modification, it must notify the FCA immediately it becomes aware of any matter which is material to the
1On the date of issuance, the issuer must send to the FCA:(1) the information in the form set out in RCB 3 Annex 5 D (issuance form);(2) the information in the form set out in RCB 3 Annex 3 D (asset and liability profile form); and(3) the final terms of the regulated covered bonds or equivalent issuance documents setting out the terms of the regulated covered bonds and signed copies of swap documents.
1An applicant must satisfy the FCA that: (1) the discretion of its board to make strategic decisions on behalf of the applicant has not been limited or transferred to a person outside the applicant’s group; and(2) its board has the capability to act on key strategic matters in the absence of a recommendation from a person outside the applicant’s group.
1In considering whether an applicant has satisfied LR 6.13.1R, the FCA will consider, among other things, whether the board of the applicant consists solely of non-executive directors and whether significant elements of the strategic decision-making of or planning for the applicant take place outside the applicant’s group, for example with an external management company.
An applicant for the admission of securitised derivatives must either:(1) have permission under the Act to carry on its activities relating to securitised derivatives and be either a bank or a securities and futures firm;(2) if the applicant is an overseas company:(a) be regulated by an overseas regulator responsible for the regulation of banks, securities firms or futures firms and which has a lead regulation agreement for financial supervision with the FCA; and(b) be carrying
Section 81 of the Act (supplementary listing particulars) requires an issuer to submit supplementary listing particulars to the FCA for approval if at any time after listing particulars have been submitted to the FCA and before the commencement of dealings in the securities following their admission to the official list:(1) there is a significant change affecting any matter contained in those particulars the inclusion of which was required by:(a) section 80 of the Act (general
An issuer must ensure that after supplementary listing particulars are approved by the FCA, the supplementary listing particulars are filed and published as if the requirements in PRR 3.2, article 21 of the Prospectus Regulation, the PR Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation3 applied to them.22
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
A parent undertaking of a management company or of an investment firm must in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that:1(1) the organisational structures of the parent undertaking and the management company or investment firm are such that the voting rights are exercised independently of the parent undertaking;(2) the persons who decide how the voting rights are exercised
Cases (a) to (h) in DTR 5.2.1 R identify situations where a person may be able to control the manner in which voting rights are exercised and where, (taking account of any aggregation with other holdings) a notification to the issuer may need to be made. In the FCA's view:(1) Case (e) produces the result that it is always necessary for the parent undertaking of a controlled undertaking to aggregate its holding with any holding of the controlled undertaking (subject to the exemptions
A person falling within Cases (a) to (h) is an indirect holder of shares for the purpose of the definition of shareholder. These indirect holdings have to be aggregated, but also separately identified in a notification to the issuer. Apart from those identified in the Cases (a) to (h), the FCA does not expect any other significant category "indirect shareholder" to be identified. Cases (a) to (h) are also relevant in determining whether a person is an indirect holder of financial