Related provisions for MCOB 5.6.85
41 - 60 of 154 items.
A firm should consider the likelihood and impact of a disruption to the continuity of its operations from unexpected events. This should include assessing the disruptions to which it is particularly susceptible (and the likely timescale of those disruptions) including through:(1) loss or failure of internal and external resources (such as people, systems and other assets);(2) the loss or corruption of its information; and(3) external events (such as vandalism, war and "acts
A firm should document its strategy for maintaining continuity of its operations, and its plans for communicating and regularly testing the adequacy and effectiveness of this strategy. A firm should establish:(1) formal business continuity plans that outline arrangements to reduce the impact of a short, medium or long-term disruption, including:(a) resource requirements such as people, systems and other assets, and arrangements for obtaining these resources;(b) the recovery
The documents in CASS 11.12.3 R that a CASS debt management firm must include within its CASS 11 resolution pack are:(1) a master document containing information sufficient to retrieve each document in the firm'sCASS 11 resolution pack;(2) a document which identifies all the approved banks with whom client money may be deposited;(3) a document which identifies each appointed representative, field representative or other agent of the firm which may receive client money in its capacity
MCOB 7.6.20R (1) and (2) allow7 a firm to make changes to wording and to add, remove or alter information that would otherwise be misleading to the customer. For example, a firm could replace the statement in Section 3 of the illustration, explaining that if information provided by the customer changes, the illustration may be affected, with a statement explaining that the illustration is based on information gathered in the past, which may no longer be accurate.7
MCOB 7.6.25R (1) and (2) allow7 the firm to make changes to wording and to add, remove or alter information that would otherwise be misleading to the customer. For example, a firm may choose not to include a property valuation in the 'What you have told us' section of the illustration if the property value does not have a bearing on the terms of the regulated mortgage contract. 7
In determining whether a customer is a large business customer for the purposes of MCOB 1.2.3 R(1), a firm will need to have regard to the figure given for the customer's annual turnover in the customer's annual report and accounts or business plan. In addition, a firm may rely on information provided by the customer about the annual turnover, unless, taking a common-sense view of this information, it has reason to doubt it.
7A firm may not treat a customer as being a high net worth mortgage customer for the purposes of MCOB unless either:(1) it is aware, from evidence already in its possession as a result of a business relationship between it and the customer, that the customer satisfies the definition of high net worth mortgage customer; or(2) it has first obtained a written statement which:(a) confirms that the customer satisfies the definition of high net worth mortgage customer;(b) specifies
10Where the regulated mortgage contract is a legacy CCA mortgage contract, the firm should not treat the customer as a high net worth mortgage customer for the purposes of MCOB unless it is aware from evidence in its possession that the customer satisfied the definition of high net worth mortgage customer at the time the contract was entered into.
(1) An authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS is responsible for communicating to the depositary of the scheme any information about the master UCITS which is required for the completion of the depositary's regulatory obligations.(2) Where a master UCITS and its feeder UCITS have different depositaries, the depositaries must enter into an information-sharing agreement in order to ensure fulfilment of their respective duties.[Note: article 61(1) first and fourth paragraphs of
(1) The information-sharing agreement referred to in COLL 11.4.1R (2) must include:(a) identification of the documents and categories of information which are to be routinely shared between both depositaries, and whether that information or those documents are provided by one depositary to the other or made available on request;(b) the manner and timing, including any applicable deadlines, of the transmission of information by the depositary of the master UCITS to the depositary
A benchmark submitter who maintains an establishment in the United Kingdom must: (1) appoint a benchmark manager with responsibility for the oversight of its compliance with this chapter; and(2) ensure that its benchmark manager has a level of authority and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
The information provided to the benchmark administrator in accordance with MAR 8.2.10R (2) should include: (1) a description of the methodology used to establish the benchmark submission; and(2) if applicable, an explanation of how any quantitative and qualitative criteria were used to establish the benchmark submission.
A firm must not:(1) claim to be able to remove negative but accurate information from a customer's credit file, including entries concerning adverse credit information and court judgments; or[Note: paragraph 3.47ai of DMG](2) mislead a customer about the length of time that negative information is held on the customer's credit file or any official register; or[Note: paragraph 3.47aii of DMG](3) claim that a new credit file can be created, such as by the customer changing address.
It is likely to be a contravention of the Principles, for example Principles 6 and Principle 7, where a firm:(1) claims in a communication to a customer to be able to remove negative but accurate entries from a customer's credit file, but where the customer enquires about this service the customer is offered instead the firm's service as a lender or a credit broker; or (2) fails to inform a customer that a credit reference agency will not respond to the firm taking steps in relation
If a firm ceases to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes54 part way through a financial year4 of the compensation scheme:4(1) it will remain liable for any unpaid levies which the FSCS has already made on the firm; and41(2) the FSCS may make one or more levies4 upon it (which may be before or after the firm5 has ceased to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes5,4 but must be before it ceases to be an authorised
In appropriate circumstances, it may be cost effective for the FCA1 to nominate or approve the appointment of, or appoint itself,2 a skilled person who has previously acted for, or advised, the person in SUP 5.2.1 G or SUP 5.2.2 G.2 For example, the FCA1 may nominate or approve the appointment of, or appoint,2 the auditor of a person in SUP 5.2.1 G or SUP 5.2.2 G2 to prepare a report or collect or update the information2 taking into account, where relevant, the considerations
The FCA1 may enter into a dialogue with the skilled person, and is ready to discuss matters relevant to the report or the collection or updating of the relevant information2 with that person1, during the preparation of the report or the collection or updating of the relevant information.2 Such discussions may2 involve or be through the person in SUP 5.2.1 G or SUP 5.2.2 G.2222
1If a listed company includes pro forma financial information in a class 1 circular, a related party circular or a circular relating to the purchase by the company of 25% or more its issued equity shares (excluding treasury shares), it must comply with the requirements for pro forma financial information set out in the PD Regulation.
(1) The guidance relevant to delegation within the firm is also relevant to external delegation ('outsourcing'). A firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations. So, for example, under Principle 3 a firm should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions by its contractor.(2) A firm should take steps to obtain sufficient information from its contractor to enable it to assess the impact of outsourcing on its systems and controls.
(1) 24A firm's arrangements should be such as to furnish its governing body with the information it needs to play its part in identifying, measuring, managing and controlling risks of regulatory concern. Three factors will be the relevance, reliability and timeliness of that information.(2) Risks of regulatory concern are those risks which relate to the fair treatment of the firm'scustomers, to the protection of consumers, to effective competition and to the integrity of the UK
It is the responsibility of the firm to decide what information is required, when, and for whom, so that it can organise and control its activities and can comply with its regulatory obligations. The detail and extent of information required will depend on the nature, scale and complexity of the business.
A firm must conduct an independent review of the CCR management system regularly through its own internal auditing process. This review must include both the activities of the business units referred to in BIPRU 13.6.41 R and of the independent CCR control unit. A review of the overall CCR management process must take place at regular intervals and must specifically address, at a minimum:(1) the adequacy of the documentation of the CCR management system and process;(2) the organisation
A firm must ensure that:(1) the model employs current market data to compute current exposures;(2) when using historical data to estimate volatility and correlations, at least three years of historical data are used and updated quarterly or more frequently if market conditions warrant;(3) the data covers a full range of economic conditions, such as a full business cycle;(4) a unit independent from the business unit validates the price supplied by the business unit;(5) the data
In addition to complying with BIPRU 4.3.54 R (Data maintenance) a firm must collect and store:(1) data used in the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools;(2) data on the estimated PDs, LGDs and conversion factors associated with grades or pools of exposures;(3) the identity of obligors and exposures that defaulted;(4) for defaultedexposures, data on the grades or pools to which the exposure was assigned over the year prior to default and the realised outcomes on LGD
Irrespective of whether a firm is using external, internal, pooled data sources or a combination of the three, for its estimation of loss characteristics, the length of the underlying historical observation period used must be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation spans a longer period for any source, and these data are relevant, this longer period must be used. However:(1) a firm need not give equal importance to historic data if this is compatible
Estimates of conversion factors must be based on data over a minimum of five years. Notwithstanding BIPRU 4.3.125 R:(1) a firm need not give equal importance to historic data if this is permitted by its IRB permission; and(2) (in the case of a firm with an IRB permission that permits this treatment of historic data) the firm must be able to convince the appropriate regulator if asked that more recent data is a better predictor of loss rates.[Note:BCD Annex VII Part 4 point 95
15A credit agreement is also an exempt agreement17 in the following cases:(1) if it is a borrower-lender agreement, the lender is a credit union and the rate of the total charge for credit (see CONC App 1) does not exceed 42.6 per cent provided that:41(a) the agreement is not an MCD regulated mortgage contract or an article 3(1)(b) credit agreement; or41(b) the agreement is an MCD regulated mortgage contract or an article 3(1)(b) credit agreement but:41(i) the agreement is of
12The activity of administering a specified benchmark comprises:(1) administering the arrangements for determining the benchmark;(2) collecting, analysing or processing information or expressions of opinion provided for the purpose of determining a specified benchmark; or(3) determining a specified benchmark through the application of a formula or other method of calculation to the information or expressions of opinion provided for that purpose.
3The following is a non-exhaustive list of rules and guidance in the Handbook that are relevant to a firm's management of operational risk: (1) COBS contains rules and guidance that can relate to the management of operational risk; for example, COBS 2 (Conduct of business obligations), COBS 4 (Communicating with clients, including financial promotions), COBS 6 (Information about the firm, its services and remuneration), COBS 7 (Insurance mediation), COBS 9 (Suitability (including
The Principles
1 Integrity |
A firm must conduct its business with integrity. |
2 Skill, care and diligence |
A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. |
3 Management and control |
A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. |
4 Financial prudence |
A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. |
5 Market conduct |
A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct. |
6 Customers' interests |
A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. |
7 Communications with clients |
A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. |
8 Conflicts of interest |
A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client. |
9 Customers: relationships of trust |
A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment. |
10 Clients' assets |
A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assets when it is responsible for them. |
11 Relations with regulators |
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the appropriate regulator appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice. |