

## Chapter 1A

# The FCA's approach to supervision



## 1A.3 The FCA's approach to supervision

### Purpose

**1A.3.1** G The *FCA* will adopt a pre-emptive approach which will be based on making forward-looking judgments about *firms'* business models, product strategy and how they run their businesses, to enable the *FCA* to identify and intervene earlier to prevent problems crystallising. The *FCA's* approach to supervising *firms* will contribute to its delivery against its objective to protect and enhance the integrity of the *UK financial system* (as set out in the *Act*). Where the *FCA* has responsibilities for prudential supervision, its focus will be on reducing the impact on customers and the integrity of the financial system of *firms* failing or being under financial strain. In addition, when *consumer* detriment does actually occur, the *FCA* will robustly seek redress for *consumers*. This approach will be delivered through a risk-based and proportionate supervisory approach.

**1A.3.2** G The overall approach in the *FCA* supervision model is based on the following principles:

- (1) forward looking and more interventionist;
- (2) focused on judgment, not process;
- (3) *consumer*-centric;
- (4) focused on the big issues and causes of problems;
- (5) interfaces with executive management/Boards;
- (6) robust when things go wrong;
- (7) focused on business model and culture as well as product supervision;
- (8) viewing poor behaviour in all markets through the lens of the impact on *consumers*;
- (9) orientated towards *firms* doing the right thing; and
- (10) externally focused, engaged and listening to all sources of information.

### The scope of the supervision model for firms

**1A.3.3** G The *FCA* supervision model risk assessment process applies to all *firms*, although the detail required may vary from *firm* to *firm*. For example, some

*firms* may experience a highly intensive level of contact although others may only be contacted once every four years. *Firms* judged as high impact are likely to require a more detailed assessment. A peer review process within the *FCA* assists consistency and will be focused on *firms* and sectors of the industry that could cause, or are causing, *consumers* harm or threaten market integrity.

1A.3.4 G The supervision model is based on three pillars:

- (1) the Firm Systematic Framework (FSF) - preventative work through structured conduct assessment of *firms*;
- (2) event-driven work - dealing with problems that are emerging or have crystallised, and securing customer redress or other remedial work (e.g. to secure the integrity of the market) where necessary; and
- (3) issues and products - thematic work on sectors of the market or products within a sector that are putting or may put *consumers* at risk

1A.3.5 G In order to create incentives for *firms* to raise standards and to maximise the success of the *FCA*'s supervisory arrangements, it is important that a *firm* understands the *FCA*'s evaluation of its risk so that it can take appropriate action.

1A.3.6 G

- (1) The *FCA* intends to communicate the outcomes of its pillars of supervision to each *firm* within an appropriate time frame. In the case of *firms* in which risks have been identified which could have a material bearing on the *FCA* meeting its *statutory objectives*, the *FCA* will also outline a remedial programme intended to address these.
- (2) The *FCA* considers that it would generally be inappropriate for a *firm* to disclose its *FCA* risk assessment to third parties, except to those who have a need or right to be aware of it, for example external auditors. *FCA* risk assessments are directed towards a specific purpose - namely illustration of the risks posed by a *firm* to the *FCA*'s *statutory objectives* and to enable the *FCA* to allocate its resources accordingly. Using a risk assessment for any other purpose has the potential to be misleading. The *FCA* therefore discourages *firms* from disclosing their assessments, unless they are required to make them public under relevant disclosure obligations.

**The nature of the FCA's relationship with firms**

1A.3.7 G As many *firms* will not have dedicated, fixed portfolio resource, the first point of contact for many issues for such *firms* will be handled by the *FCA*'s Contact Centre, with the aim being that fewer issues and queries will need to be referred to the supervisors. To support all *firms* the *FCA* will also provide regional workshops and road shows to clarify its expectations on these risks and issues that are particularly important to the *FCA*.

**The nature of the FCA's relationship with the PRA**

1A.3.8

G

While respecting each regulator's different *statutory objectives* and mandates, in undertaking its supervisory activity the *FCA* will co-ordinate and co-operate with the *PRA* as required and necessary in the interests of the effective and efficient supervision of regulated *firms* and individuals. Both regulators will coordinate with each other as required under the *Act*, including on the exchange of information relevant to each regulator's individual objectives. However, the *FCA* and *PRA* will act independently from one another when engaging with *firms*, reflecting an independent but co-ordinated regulatory approach. Maintaining effective working relationships with the *PRA* will be vital to achieving the *FCA* vision. To this end, and as required under the *Act*, the *FCA* will maintain a memorandum of understanding with the *PRA* which will set out how the two organisations will work together.