REP017 Payments Fraud Report

1 Please select the period that the data in this return covers

Table 1 - Payment transactions and fraudulent payment transactions for payment services

Credit transfers

0.0		Α	B Geogr	C aphical breakdowr	D n for payment trans	E sactions	F	G	H Geographic	l cal breakdown for f	J raudulent payment	K transactions	L
		Dom	nestic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-borde	r outside EEA	Dom	nestic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-border	r outside EEA
		By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value
2	Total credit transfers of which:												
3	Initiated by payment initiation service providers					<u> </u>							
4	Initiated non-electronically												
5	Initiated electronically of which:												
6	Initiated via remote payment channel of which:												
7	Authenticated via strong customer authentication of which fraudulent credit transfers by fraud types:					<u> </u>							
8	Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster										1		
9	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
10	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order									ļ			
11	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication			ļ						ļ			
12	of which fraudulent credit transfers by fraud types: Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster												I
13	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
14	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order												
45	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication		ı	T	T		ı	· -	1	T	ı	T	i
15 16	Low value Payment to self												
17	Trusted beneficiary												
18	Recurring transaction												
19 20	Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols Transaction risk analysis												
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21	Initiated via non-remote payment channel of which:]							
22	Authenticated via strong customer authentication												
23	of which fraudulent credit transfers by fraud types: Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster									1	I		
24	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
25	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order												
26	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication			I	I		I			I	1		
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27 28	Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
29	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order												
	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication												
30	Payment to self												
31 32	Trusted beneficiary Recurring transaction												
33	Contactless low value												
34	Unattended terminal for transport or parking fares												
	Losses due to fraud per liability bearer:	A Total losses											
35	The reporting payment service provider	Total losses	1										
36	The Payment service user (payer)]										
37	Others		J										
ъ.													
Dire	ect debits	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	н	1	J	K	L
				aphical breakdowr						cal breakdown for f	raudulent payment	transactions	
		Dom	nestic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-borde	r outside EEA	Dom	nestic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-border	r outside EEA
		By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value
38	Total direct debits												
_	of which:								T			T	1
39	Consent given via an electronic mandate of which fraudulent direct debits by fraud type:		l	I	<u> </u>	I	<u> </u>			1		<u> </u>	<u> </u>
40	Unauthorised payment transactions								<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
41	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to consent to a direct debit												

_	On the state of th		1	1		1				1	I		
2	Consent given in another form than an electronic mandate												
	of which fraudulent direct debits by fraud type:												
3	Unauthorised payment transactions												
1	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to consent to a direct debit												
•	Manipulation of the payer by the naddster to consent to a direct debit									l .			
	the state of the s												
	Losses due to fraud per liability bearer:	Α											
		Total losses											
5	The reporting payment service provider												
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o i	The Payment service user (payer)												
7	Others												
			_										
ard	payments (except cards with an e-money function only)												
		Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	н	1	J	K	L
		1 ^								•			- 1
			Geog	raphical breakdowr	n for payment tran	sactions			Geographica	al breakdown for fr	audulent payment	transactions	
				·									
		Doi	mestic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-borde	r outside EEA	Dome	estic	Cross-borde	er within EEA	Cross-border	outside EEA
			T .	— .		- .		<u> </u>					
		By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value
3	Total card payments (except cards with an e-money function only)												
•	of which:		l	1	1	1		l		1			
	OF WHICH:												
2	Initiated non-electronically												
9	mitated non-electronically												
)	Initiated electronically				I								
	of which:	-	•			•				•			
1	Initiated via remote payment channel												
	of which broken down by card function:		1	-	1	1				1	I		
						1				1	ı		
_	Payments with cards with a debit function				<u></u>		<u> </u>						
3	Payments with cards with a credit or delayed debit function												
												ı l	
	of which:												
4	Authenticated via strong customer authentication												
•												Į.	
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:												
5	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster												
	of which:									•			
2	Lost or stolen card									1			
-													
7	Card not received												
3	Counterfeit card												
2	Card details theft												
-													
)	Other												
1	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
2	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment												
_	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment							ļ		ļ			
3	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication						1						
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:		•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	
4	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster									1			
+										<u> </u>			
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5	Lost or stolen card												
3	Card not received												
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/	Counterfeit card												
3	Card details theft												
a	Other												
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	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
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	of which broken down to a second and the second and the second as a												
	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication									,			
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3	Trusted beneficiary				T .	T							
1	Recurring transaction		+	1									
-			+		 	-							
י	Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols			1									
3	Transaction risk analysis						1	∃					
	•		•	•	•	•				•	•	I	
7	Initiated via non-remote payment channel		1	1	1	1				1		1	1
1	Initiated via non-remote payment channel			1	L	L				l	L		
	of which broken down by card function:												
3	Payments with cards with a debit function												
2	Payments with cards with a credit or delayed debit function												
9	rayments with cards with a credit of delayed debit function							<u> </u>					
	of which:												
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J	Authenticated via strong customer authentication												
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:												
1	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster												
	of which:							ļ1		·	l .	l l	
_										1			
2	Lost or stolen card							l					
3	Card not received									I			
1	Counterfeit card							 		i			
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)	Other												
3	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster									<u> </u>			
7	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment									i			
	manipulation of the payor to make a data payment									I	1	<u> </u>	
3	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication	L	<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:	-		_									
a								I				I	1
,	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster									<u> </u>	L		
	of which:												
)	Lost or stolen card							1 1		I	l		

91	Card not received												
92	Counterfeit card												
93 94	Other Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
95	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment									+			
	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication									1		1	
96	Trusted beneficiary												
97	Recurring transaction												
98	Contactless low value												
99	Unattended terminal for transport or parking fares												
	Losses due to fraud per liability bearer:	Α											
		Total losses	1										
100 101	The reporting payment service provider The Payment service user (payer)		-										
102	Others		1										
			•										
Card	payments acquired (except cards with an e-money function only)												
Oaru	payments acquired (except cards with an e-money function only)	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	н	1	J	K	L
			Geogr	aphical breakdown	for payment trans	actions				cal breakdown for fr	raudulent payment		
		Dom	nestic		r within EEA		r outside EEA	Dom	estic		er within EEA	Cross-borde	outside EEA
		By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value
103	Total card payments acquired (except cards with an e-money function only)	By volume	by value	by volume	by value	by volume	By value	by volume	by value	By volume	by value	by volume	by value
.00	of which:		l .			I.				<u> </u>		1	<u> </u>
104	Initiated non-electronically												
	·												
105	Initiated electronically of which:									1			
400			1	1		1				1	ı		
106	Acquired via a remote channel of which broken down by card function:	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			<u> </u>				ļ	<u> </u>	ļ	
107	Payments with cards with a debit function												
108	Payments with cards with a credit or delayed debit function												
	of which:												
109	Authenticated via strong customer authentication												
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:												
110	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster of which:												
111	Lost or stolen card												
112	Card not received												
113	Counterfeit card												
114 115	Card details theft Other									+			
110	Still									1	1	I	
116	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
117	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment									1	I	ı	
117	wampulation of the payor to make a card payment									1		I	
118	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication												
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:												
119	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster												
120	of which: Lost or stolen card									T	1		
121	Card not received												
122	Counterfeit card												
123 124	Card details theft Other									+		+	
125	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
126	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment									T	1		
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	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication											1	1
127 128	Low value Recurring transaction												
129	Transaction risk analysis												
									-				
130	Acquired via a non-remote channel												
131	of which broken down by card function: Payments with cards with a debit function						T			1			
132	Payments with cards with a credit or delayed debit function												
	of which:												
133	Authenticated via strong customer authentication]			
	of which fraudulent card payments by fraud types:												
134	Issuance of a payment order by a fraudster									1			
135	of which: Lost or stolen card									T	I	1	
136	Card not received									<u> </u>	<u></u>		
137	Counterfeit card												

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Mathematical times requirement and mathematical times and the second particularly and par	140	Manipulation of the naver to make a card navment								I	1			
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1	1.40	of which:								I	ı		1	
14														
Page														
Manual Industrial programme for an industry groung groun														
Part Part	147	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster									<u> </u>			
	148	Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment												
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10							1	 						
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The control control state state is equivalent and state and stat		Losses due to fraud per liability bearer:	Α											
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which polared counts for account free about function Payments with case with a count function Payments with case with a count for deal polary double function Payments with case with a count for function of the polary polary double function Payments with case with a count function of the polary polary double function Payments with case with a count function of the polary polary double function Payments with case with a count function of the polary polary double function Payments with case with a count function of the polary polary double function of the polary by minutes with case with			By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value	By volume	By value
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Total losses The Payment service user (account holder) The Payment service user (account holder) The Payment transactions A B C D E F G H I J K L Geographical breakdown for payment transactions Domestic Cross-border within EEA Cross-border ustale EEA By volume By value By vol	163	Manipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawal												
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	175	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster												
of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication	176													
		of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication												

177	Low value
178	Trusted beneficiary
179	Recurring transaction
180	Payment to self
181	Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols
182	Transaction risk analysis
183	Via non-remote payment initiation channel of which:
184	Authenticated via strong customer authentication
	of which fraudulent credit transfers by fraud types:
185	Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
186	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
187	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
188	Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication of which fraudulent credit transfers by fraud types:
189	Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
190	Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
191	Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
	of which broken down by reason for not applying strong customer authentication
192	Trusted beneficiary
193	Recurring transaction
194	Contactless low value
195	Unattended terminal for transport or parking fares
	Losses due to fraud per liability bearer:
196 197 198	The reporting payment service provider The Payment service user Others

Money remittances

199 Total money remittances

Payment transactions initiated by payment initiation service providers

200	Total payment transactions initiated by payment initiation service provide of which:
201	Initiated via remote payment channel of which:
202	Authenticated via Strong Customer Authentication
203	Authenticated via non-Strong Customer Authentication
204	Initiated via non-remote payment channel of which:
205	Authenticated via Strong Customer Authentication
206	Authenticated via non-Strong Customer Authentication
	of which broken down by payment instrument
207	Credit transfers
208	Other

Table 2 - Fraud relating to account information services

	+
A B C D E F G H I J K	L
Geographical breakdown for payment transactions Geographical breakdown for fraudulent payment transactions	
	order outside EEA
By volume By value By value By volume	By value
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	-
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Α	В	С
Number of incidents of fraud	Total value of fraud across all incidents (or an estimation of the loss to the persons defrauded (£)	Please provide a brief description of how fraud was commonly committed - descriptions of up to three different fraud types, in order of those with the highest loss