SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS (REMUNERATION CODES) (No 8) INSTRUMENT 2020

Powers exercised

- A. The Financial Conduct Authority ("the FCA") makes this instrument in the exercise of the following powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the Act"):
 - (1) section 137A (The FCA's general rules);
 - (2) section 137H (General rules about remuneration);
 - (3) section 137T (General supplementary powers); and
 - (4) section 139A (Power of the FCA to give guidance).
- B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rule-making instruments) of the Act.

Commencement

C. This instrument comes into force on 29 December 2020.

Amendments to the Handbook

- D. The Glossary of definitions is amended in accordance with Annex A to this instrument.
- E. The Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC) is amended in accordance with Annex B to this instrument.

Notes

F. In the Annexes to this instrument, the "notes" (indicated by "**Note:**") are included for the convenience of readers but do not form part of the legislative text.

Citation

G. This instrument may be cited as the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (Remuneration Codes) (No 8) Instrument 2020.

By order of the Board 10 December 2020

Annex A

Amendments to the Glossary of definitions

In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text, unless otherwise stated.

Insert the following new definitions in the appropriate alphabetical position. The text is not underlined.

means the arithmetic mean of the *firm's* total assets on: average total assets

> for a firm within the scope of SYSC 19D.1.1R(1)(a), (1)(b) or (1)(c), each of its last four accounting reference dates; or

for a *firm* within the scope of SYSC 19D.1.1R(1)(d), 31 December

of each of the preceding four years.

CRD V CRD as amended by Directive 2019/878 of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive

2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation

measures

control functions has the meaning in article 3 of the *Material Risk Takers*

Regulation 2020.

gender neutral

means a remuneration policy based on equal pay for male and remuneration policy

female workers for equal work or work of equal value.

[**Note:** article 3(1)(65) of *CRD V*]

higher paid material

risk taker

means a dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff member whose total *remuneration* exceeds £500,000 and whose annual variable remuneration exceeds 33% of that total remuneration.

has the meaning in article 4(1)(146) of the EU CRR. large institution

managerial responsibility has the meaning in article 2 of the *Material Risk Takers*

Regulation 2020.

material business unit

has the meaning in article 4 of the *Material Risk Takers*

Regulation 2020.

Material Risk Takers

Regulation 2020

means the draft regulatory technical standards on criteria to define managerial responsibility and control functions, a material business unit and a significant impact on its risk profile, and

categories of staff whose professional activities have a material

impact on an institution's risk profile, published by the *EBA* on 18 June 2020.

significant firm

means a *firm* that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.

Amend the following definition as shown.

dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff (in relation to a *dual-regulated firm* and an *overseas firm* in *SYSC* 19D.1.1R(1)(d) that would have been a *UK bank*, *building society* or *UK designated investment firm* if it had been a *UK domestic firm*) has the meaning in *SYSC* 19D.3.4R which is, in summary, an *employee* whose professional activities have a material impact on the *firm's* risk profile, including any *employee* who is deemed to have a material impact on the *firm's* risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers) the *Material Risk Takers Regulation* 2020.

Annex B

Amendments to the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC)

In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text, unless otherwise stated.

19D	Dual	Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code					
•••							
19D.2	Gene	General requirement					
19D.2.2							
	Gend	nder neutral policies and practices					
19D.2.2 <u>A</u>	<u>R</u>	A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is a gender neutral remuneration policy and the practices referred to in SYSC 19D.2.1R are gender neutral.					
		[Note: articles 74(1) and 92(2)(aa) of <i>CRD V</i>]					
<u>19D.2.2</u> <u>B</u>	<u>G</u>	Firms are reminded that the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's protected characteristics both before and after employment is offered. The Act applies to pay and all other contractual terms, including variable remuneration. A firm should ensure that its remuneration policy complies with the Equality Act 2010.					
<u>19D.2.2</u> <u>C</u>	<u>G</u>	Firms should ensure that when they assess individual performance, the assessment process and any variable remuneration awarded in accordance with SYSC 19D.3.39R does not discriminate on the basis of the protected characteristics of an individual.					
19D.3	Remuneration principles						
19D.3.1	R	(1)					
		[Note: article 92(1) of CRD]					
<u>19D.3.2</u> <u>A</u>	<u>G</u>	Firms should refer to SYSC 12 (Group risk systems and controls requirements), which sets out how the systems and control requirements					

imposed by SYSC (Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls) apply where a *firm* is part of a *group*.

- - (a) the firm is not a large institution; and
 - (b) the *firm's average total assets*, calculated on an individual basis in accordance with *CRD V* and the *EU CRR*, are less than or equal to €5 billion.
 - (2) For a *firm* within the scope of *SYSC* 19D.1.1R(1)(d), the *rules* in (3) do not apply if the *average total assets* that relate to the activities of the *UK branch* are less than or equal to €5 billion.
 - (3) The *rules* referred to in (1) and (2) are:
 - (a) <u>SYSC 19D.3.31R(2) and (3) (pension policy);</u>
 - (b) SYSC 19D.3.56R (retained shares or other instruments); and
 - (c) SYSC 19D.3.59R (deferral).

[**Note**: article 94(3)(a) of *CRD V*]

- 19D.3.2 R (1) The value in SYSC 19D.3.2BR(1)(b) or (2) is increased to €15 billion if:
 - (a) the *firm* meets the criteria set out in points (145)(c), (d) and (e) of Article 4(1) of the *EU CRR*; and
 - (b) the increase is appropriate taking into account the *firm's* nature, the scope and complexity of its activities, its internal organisation and (if applicable) the characteristics of the *group* to which it belongs.
 - (2) For a *firm* within the scope of *SYSC* 19D.1.1R(1)(d), the criteria referred to in (1)(a) must be assessed on the basis of the activities of the *UK branch*.

[Note: article 94(4) of CRD V]

Application: categories of staff and proportionality

19D.3.3 R ...

(2) When establishing and applying the total *remuneration* policies for *dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff*, a *firm* must comply with this section in a way, and to the extent, that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the

complexity of its activities (the *dual-regulated firms remuneration* principles proportionality rule).

...

19D.3.4 R (1) Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff comprises:

- (a) an *employee* of a *dual-regulated firm* whose professional activities have a material impact on the *firm's* risk profile, including any *employee* who is deemed to have a material impact on the *firm's* risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers) the *Material Risk Takers Regulation 2020*; or
- (b) subject to (2) and (3), an *employee* of an *overseas* firm in SYSC 19D.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e., an *overseas* firm that would have been a *UK* bank, building society or *UK* designated investment firm if it had been a *UK* domestic firm) whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile, including any *employee* who would meet any of the criteria set out in articles 3 or 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 articles 6 or 7(1) of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation* 2020 if it had applied to him them.
- (1A) For the purposes of paragraph (1), dual-regulated firms

 Remuneration Code staff must, at least, include:
 - (a) all members of the *firm's management body* and *senior management*;
 - (b) <u>staff members with managerial responsibility over the</u> <u>firm's control functions or material business units;</u>
 - (c) staff members entitled to significant *remuneration* in the preceding financial year, provided that the following conditions are met:
 - (i) the staff member's remuneration is equal to or higher than:
 - (A) €500,000; and
 - (B) the average remuneration awarded to the members of the firm's management body and senior management referred to in point (a);
 - (ii) the staff member performs the professional activity within a *material business unit* and the activity is of a

kind that has a significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile.

[Note: article 92(3) of CRD V]

- (2) An overseas firm in SYSC 19D1.1.R(1)(d) (i.e., an overseas firm that would have been a dual-regulated firm if it had been a UK domestic firm) may deem an employee not to be a dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff where:
 - (a) the *employee*:
 - (i) would meet the criteria in article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 article 7(1) of the Material Risk Takers Regulation 2020;
 - (ii) would not meet any of the criteria in article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 article 6 of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation 2020*; and
 - (iii) ...
 - (b) the *overseas firm* determines that the professional activities of the *employee* do not have a material impact on its risk profile on the grounds described in article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 article 7(2) of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation 2020*; and
 - (c) the *overseas firm* has obtained the prior written approval of the *PRA*, in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Remuneration Part of the *PRA Rulebook*.
- (3) Where the *overseas firm* deems an *employee* not to be *dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff* as set out in (2), it must notify the *FCA*, applying the approach described in article 4(4) of Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014. [deleted]

[Note: article 92(2) of *CRD V* and articles 3 and 4 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 articles 6 and 7 of the *Material Risk Takers* Regulation 2020.]

...

19D.3.1 R (1) A <u>significant firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee.</u>

...

. . .

Remuneration Principle 12: Remuneration structures - introduction

19D.3.3 G (1) Taking account of the *dual regulated firms remuneration*5 R principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a *firm* to apply the rules in (2) where, The rules in (2) do not apply to a *firm* in relation to an individual (X), where both the following conditions are satisfied:

- (a) Condition 1 is that X's <u>annual</u> variable *remuneration* is no more than 33% one third of X's total <u>annual</u> *remuneration*; and
- (b) Condition 2 is that X's total <u>annual</u> variable remuneration is no more than £500,000 €50,000.
- (2) The *rules* referred to in (1) are those relating to:
 - (a) guaranteed variable remuneration (SYSC 19D.3.44R); pension policy (SYSC 19D.3.31R(2) and (3));

...

(d) performance adjustment (SYSC 19D.3.61R). [deleted]

[Note: article 94(3)(b) of *CRD V*]

• • •

Remuneration Principle 12(f): Remuneration structures - retained shares or other instruments

- 19D.3.5 R (1) A *firm* must ensure that a substantial portion, which is at least 50%, of any variable *remuneration* consists of an appropriate balance of:
 - (a) <u>subject to the legal structure of the firm concerned:</u> shares or equivalent ownership interests; or share-linked <u>instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments</u> subject to the legal structure of the firm concerned, or share-linked <u>instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments</u> in the case of a non-listed firm; and

• • •

...

Remuneration Principle 12(g): Remuneration structures - deferral

19D.3.5 R (1) <u>In relation to higher paid material risk takers a</u> A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a

- substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than:
- (a) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who do not perform a PRA-designated senior management function FCA-designated senior management function, three to five years, with no vesting taking place until one year after the award, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis-;
- (b) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who perform a PRA-designated senior management function, seven years, with no vesting taking place until three years after the award, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis-; and
- (c) for any other dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who do not fall within (a) or (b) above, four years, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis.
- (1A) In relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who are not higher paid material risk takers, a firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than:
 - (a) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who perform a FCA-designated senior management function at a significant firm, five years, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis;
 - (b) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who perform a PRA-designated senior management function at a significant firm, five years, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis;
 - (c) for any other dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff
 who do not fall within (a) or (b) above, four years, and
 vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis.
- (2) In the case of a variable *remuneration* component:
 - (a) of £500,000 or more, or
 - (b) payable to a *director* of a *firm* that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities *significant firm*;

at least 60% of the amount must be deferred on the basis set out in SYSC 19D.3.59R(1) and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis.

...

. . .

Remuneration Principle 12(h): Remuneration structures - performance adjustment (affordability, malus, clawback)

19D.3.6 R A *firm* must ensure that:

...

- (3) any variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least seven years from the date on which the variable remuneration is awarded; and for higher paid material risk takers, variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least seven years from the date on which the variable remuneration is awarded;
- (3A) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who are not higher paid material risk takers:
 - (a) who are *PRA-designated senior management function*holders at a *significant firm*, the deferred component of
 variable *remuneration* is subject to clawback for a period of
 at least six years from the date on which the variable
 remuneration is awarded;
 - (b) who are FCA-designated senior management function holders at a significant firm, the deferred component of variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least six years from the date on which the variable remuneration is awarded;
 - who do not fall within (a) or (b) above, the deferred component of variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least five years from the date on which the variable remuneration is awarded;
 - (d) the undeferred component of variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least one year from the date on which the variable remuneration is awarded; and
- (4) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff whose total annual remuneration is greater than £500,000 and who perform either a PRA-designated senior management function or FCA-designated senior management function, it can, by notice to the employee employee to be given no later than seven years after the variable remuneration was awarded, extend the period during which variable remuneration is subject to clawback to at least ten

years from the date on which the variable *remuneration* is awarded, where:

...

...

...

19D.3.6 R

(1) Subject to (2) to (7), the *rules* in *SYSC* 19D Annex 1.1R to 1.6R apply in relation to the prohibitions on *dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff* being *remunerated* in the ways specified in:

...

- (7) This *rule* does not apply in relation to *dual regulated firms**Remuneration Code staff (X) in respect of whom both the following conditions are satisfied: This *rule* does not apply to a *firm* in relation to an individual (X), where both the following conditions are satisfied:
 - (a) Condition 1 is that X's <u>annual</u> variable *remuneration* is no more than 33% one third of X's total <u>annual</u> *remuneration*; and
 - (b) Condition 2 is that X's total annual variable remuneration is no more than £500,000 €50,000.

. . .

. . .

Insert the following new transitional provision, TP 9, after SYSC TP 8 (Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016: Application to claims management companies). The text is not underlined.

TP 9	Updates to reflect CRD V							
	Material to which the transitional provision applies	R/G Transitional Provision		Transitional Provision: dates in force	Handbook Provision: coming into force			
1	SYSC 19D.3		A firm subject to SYSC 19D.1.3 on 28	From 29 December 2020	29 December 2020			

December 2020, must apply the rules and guidance in *SYSC* 19D.3 as it stood on the 28 December 2020 in relation to: (a) remuneration awarded, whether pursuant to a contract or otherwise, in relation to the performance year active on the 28 December 2020; (b) remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before 29 December 2020 which is awarded or paid in relation to the performance year active on the 28 December 2020; and (c) remuneration awarded, but not yet paid, before 29 December 2020, for services

	provided in the performance year active on the 28 December 2020.
--	------------------------------------------------------------------

Amend the following as shown.

Sch 2	Not	Notification requirements						
Sch 2.1	G							
		(3)	Table					
			Handbook reference	Matter to be notified	Content of the notification	Trigger event		
			•••					
			SYSC 19D.3.4R(3)	Where an overseas firm deems an employee not to be dual regulated firms Remuneration Code staff	Matter described in SYSC 19D.3.4R(3)	Matter described in SYSC 19D.3.4R(3)		
			•••					
						1		