
Fraud

## Chapter 4

Fraud



	nples of good practice	Exam	ples of poor practice	
•	<b>Lessons</b> are learnt from incidents of fraud.	•	Staff <b>lack awareness</b> of what constitutes fraudulent behav our (e.g. for a salesman to m report a customer's salary to secure a loan would be fraud).	
•	Anti-fraud good practice is shared widely within the firm.	•	Sales incentives act to encour age staff or management to turn a blind eye to potential fraud.	
•	To guard against <b>insider</b> <b>fraud</b> , staff in high risk posi- tions (e.g. finance depart- ment, trading floor) are sub- ject to enhanced vetting and closer scrutiny. 'Four eyes' pro- cedures (see FCG Annex 1 for common terms) are in place.	•	Banks fail to implement the requirements of the <b>Paymen</b> <b>Services Regulations</b> and <b>Banking Conduct of Business</b> <b>rules</b> , leaving customers out of pocket after fraudulent transactions are made.	
•	Enhanced due diligence is per- formed on higher risk cus- tomers (e.g. commercial cus- tomers with limited financial history. See 'long firm fraud' in FCG Annex 1).	•	<b>Remuneration structures</b> may incentivise behaviour that in- creases the risk of mortgage fraud.	
Mor	tgage fraud – lenders			
This section applies to mortgage lenders within the supervisory scope of the appropriate regulator.				
Self-a	ssessment questions:			
•Are systems and controls to detect and prevent mortgage fraud <b>coordinated across the firm</b> , with resources allocated on the basis an assessment of where they can be used to best effect?				
		ith res	ources allocated on the basis o	
		ith res an be he frau	ources allocated on the basis o used to best effect?	
	<ul><li>an assessment of where they c</li><li>How does your firm contain t</li></ul>	ith res an be he frau <b>uers</b> ? n enga	ources allocated on the basis o used to best effect? ud risks posed by corrupt	
Exar	an assessment of where they c •How does your firm contain t <b>conveyancers, brokers and val</b> •How and when does your firm <b>information-sharing exercises</b> ?	ith res an be he frau <b>uers</b> ? n enga	ources allocated on the basis o used to best effect? ud risks posed by corrupt ge with <b>cross-industry</b>	
Exar •	<ul> <li>an assessment of where they c</li> <li>How does your firm contain t</li> <li>conveyancers, brokers and val</li> <li>How and when does your firm</li> </ul>	ith res an be he frau <b>uers</b> ? n enga	ources allocated on the basis o used to best effect? ud risks posed by corrupt	

		Examples of good practice	Examples of poor practice
		• A lender reviews existing mortgage books to identify and assess mortgage fraud in- dicators.	• A lender's panels of conveyan- cers, brokers and valuers are too large to be manageable.
		• A lender verifies that funds are being dispersed in line with instructions before it re- leases them.	• The lender does no work to identify <b>dormant parties</b> .
		• A lender <b>promptly discharges</b> mortgages that have been re- deemed and checks whether conveyancers register charges with the <b>Land Registry</b> in good time.	• A lender relies solely on the Financial Services Register when vetting brokers.
			<ul> <li>Underwriters' demanding work targets undermine ef- forts to contain mortgage fraud.</li> </ul>
		Mortgage fraud – intermediari	es
4.2.3	G	This section applies to mortgage inter	mediaries.
		Self-assessment questions:	
		<ul> <li>does your firm satisfy itself the fraud?</li> </ul>	nat it is able to <b>recognise</b> mortgage
		information the applicant pro declared income believable co the value of the requested mo	s, does your firm consider whether the vides is <b>consistent</b> ? (For example, is mpared with stated employment? Is ortgage comparable with what your of the property to be purchased?)
		•What due diligence does you	r firm undertake on <b>introducers</b> ?
		Examples of good practice	Examples of poor practice
		• Asking to see <b>original docu-</b> <b>mentation</b> whether or not this is required by lenders.	• Failing to undertake due dili- gence on <b>introducers</b> .
		• Using the FCA's Information from Brokers scheme to report intermediaries it suspects of involvement in mortgage fraud.	• Accepting all applicant in- formation at <b>face value</b> .
			<ul> <li>Treating due diligence as the lender's responsibility.</li> </ul>
		Enforcement action against mo	rtgage brokers
4.2.4	G	Since the FSA began regulating mortg have banned over 100 mortgage brok	

•deliberately submitting to lenders applications containing false or misleading information; and

•failing to have adequate systems and controls in place to deal with the risk of mortgage fraud.

The FSA have referred numerous cases to law enforcement, a number of which have resulted in criminal convictions.

## Investment fraud

4.2.5

G

UK consumers are targeted by share-sale frauds and other scams including land-banking frauds, unauthorised collective investment schemes and Ponzi schemes. Customers of UK deposit-takers may fall victim to these frauds, or be complicit in them. We expect these risks to be considered as part of deposit-takers' risk assessments, and for this to inform management's decisions about the allocation of resources to a) the detection of fraudsters among the customer base and b) the protection of potential victims.

Self-assessment questions:

•Have the risks of investment fraud (and other frauds where customers and third parties suffer losses) been considered by the firm?

•Are resources allocated to mitigating these risks as the result of purposive decisions by management?

•Are the firm's anti-money laundering controls able to identify customers who are complicit in investment fraud?

Examples of good practice	Examples of poor practice
<ul> <li>A bank regularly assesses the risk to itself and its customers of losses from fraud, including investment fraud, in accord- ance with their established risk management framework. The risk assessment does not only cover situations where the bank could cover losses, but also where customers could lose and not be reim- bursed by the bank. Resource allocation and mitigation measures are informed by this assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>A bank has performed no risk assessment that considers the risk to customers from invest- ment fraud.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>A bank contacts customers if it suspects a payment is being made to an investment fraudster.</li> </ul>	• A bank fails to use actionable, credible information it has about known or suspected perpetrators of investment fraud in its financial crime pre- vention systems.

Exam	ples of good practice	Exam	ples of poor practice
•	A bank has transaction mon- itoring rules designed to de- tect specific types of invest- ment fraud. Investment fraud subject matter experts help set these rules.	•	Ongoing monitoring of com- mercial accounts is allocated to customer-facing staff incen tivised to bring in or retain business. A bank allocates excessive numbers of commercial ac- counts to a staff member to monitor
			counts to a staff member to monitor.